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QUESTION PRESENTED
In Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479
(1996), this Court held that where Congress had
imposed “elaborate enforcement provisions” in one
statute allowing for monetary awards, Congressional
authorization for mere injunctions in a different
statute did not include monetary relief. Years later,
this Court denied the Government’s petition for a
writ of certiorari after the District of Columbia
Circuit applied Meghrig by holding that an
injunction section of the RICO Act did not permit a
disgorgement remedy since RICO provided elaborate
enforcement provisions elsewhere for such relief. See
United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d
1190 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 960 (2005).
The question presented here is whether,
following Meghrig, the presence of elaborate
enforcement provisions authorizing monetary relief
under Section 19 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57b,
precludes interpreting monetary remedies into the
purely injunctive language of Section 13(b), 15
U.S.C. § 53(b).

i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Kristy Ross, an individual, is the Petitioner.
The United States Federal Trade Commission is the
Respondent.

ii

RULE 29.6 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE
STATEMENT
Not applicable.
Parties and individuals who are no longer
participating in this matter (having defaulted or
settled) are:
INNOVATIVE
MARKETING,
INC.,
d/b/a
Winsolutions FZ-LLC, d/b/a Billingnow, d/b/a
Winpayment Consultancy SPC, d/b/a BillPlanet PTE
Ltd., d/b/a Revenue Response Sunwell, d/b/a
Globedat, d/b/a Winsecure Solutions, d/b/a Synergy
Software BV, d/b/a Innovative Marketing Ukraine;
BYTEHOSTING INTERNET SERVICES, LLC;
JAMES RENO, d/b/a Setupahost.net, individually,
and as an officer of ByteHosting Internet Services,
LLC; SAM JAIN, individually and as an officer of
Innovative Marketing, Inc.; DANIEL SUNDIN, d/b/a
Vantage Software, d/b/a Winsoftware, Ltd.,
individually and as an officer of Innovative
Marketing, Inc.; MARC D’SOUZA, d/b/a Web
Integrated Net Solutions, individually and as an
officer of Innovative Marketing, Inc.; MAURICE
D’SOUZA.
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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner Kristy Ross respectfully petitions
for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, insofar as it allowed the award of monetary
remedies under Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (App. at 1a-16a) is
reported at 743 F.3d 886. The findings and
conclusions of the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland (App. at 17a-53a) are
reported at 897 F. Supp. 2d 369.
JURISDICTION
The Fourth Circuit issued its opinion and
judgment on February 25, 2014. This Petition is thus
timely. Jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. §
1254(1).

1

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Section 13(b) of the FTC Act states in
pertinent part: “a temporary restraining order or a
preliminary injunction may be granted without
bond,” and “[in] proper cases the Commission may
seek, and after proper proof, the court may issue, a
permanent injunction.” 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
Section 19(b) of the FTC Act states in
pertinent part:
The court in an action under subsection
(a) of this section shall have jurisdiction
to grant such relief as the court finds
necessary
to
redress
injury
to
consumers
or
other
persons,
partnerships,
and
corporations
resulting from the rule violation or the
unfair or deceptive act or practice, as
the case may be. Such relief may
include, but shall not be limited to,
rescission or reformation of contracts,
the refund of money or return of
property, the payment of damages, and
public notification respecting the rule
violation or the unfair or deceptive act
or practice, as the case may be . . . .
15 U.S.C. § 57b(b).

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case presents a rare chance to review a
nonstatutory Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)
strategy that, by the FTC’s own admission, resulted
in over 300 FTC complaint-filings and over $2 billion
in consent- and litigated-judgments in the past six
years alone. (App. at 54a). Just last year, a former
Chair of the FTC published a scholarly analysis of
this strategy and criticized its lack of an appropriate
legal basis.1 Commentators have widely criticized the
strategy as one that exceeds the FTC’s statutory
authority and coerces settlements by individuals and
businesses alike.2 The strategy, therefore, dissuades
those with the greatest interest in this Court’s
review from seeking its elimination. Though several
circuit courts have given their imprimatur to it over
the past 30 years, this case is apparently the first
after Meghrig v. KFC Western, 516 U.S. 479 (1996),
to bring the FTC’s overreaching before this Court for
review.
J. Howard Beales III & Timothy J. Muris, Striking
the Proper Balance: Redress Under Section 13(b) of
the FTC Act, 79 Antitrust L.J. 1, 26 (2013) (hereafter,
“Beales & Muris”) (“[Section 19’s] enactment
suggests that no such [consumer redress] authority
was ever granted [in Section 13(b)].”).
2 Peter C. Ward, Restitution for Consumers under the
Federal Trade Commission Act: Good Intentions or
Congressional Intentions?, 41 Am. U.L. Rev. 1139,
1191-92 (1992) (“[T]he finding that section 13(b)
permits an unrestricted means of restitution creates
such a conflict with section 19 that an ‘inescapable
1
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The issue is now as fully percolated as it is
likely to be. The Fourth Circuit in this case found
Petitioner’s arguments seeking to end the FTC’s
overreaching “not entirely unpersuasive,” yet gave
them no effect out of a stated reluctance to create a
circuit split. (App. at 7a-8a). With such circuit court
reasoning, it becomes increasingly unlikely that any
future circuit court will be willing to rein in FTC
illegality and overreaching.
In short, courts have allowed the FTC to read
Section 13(b) of the FTC Act to seek monetary
remedies in consumer protection cases, when that
Section only contains express authorization for
inference’ arises that the power to grant permanent
injunctions under section 13(b) does not include the
power to grant redress to consumers injured by the
conduct giving rise to the injunction when the
requirements of section 19 have not been satisfied.”);
see also George P. Roach, Counter-Restitution for
Monetary Remedies in Equity, 68 Wash & Lee L. Rev.
1271, 1309 (2011) (“[A] defendant might readily
settle for an injunction and a moderate monetary
award rather than face the prospect of defending a
claim for a large claim for gross disgorgement in a
district court that has previously agreed to follow the
FTC’s aggressive theory of monetary damages in
equity.”); Michael Thurman & Michael L. Mallow,
“Hid[ing] Elephants in Mouseholes”: the FTC’s
Unwarranted Attempt to Regulate the Debt-ReliefServices Industry Using Rulemaking Authority
Purportedly Granted by the Telemarketing and
Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act,” 14 Tex.
Rev. L. & Pol. 301, 305-15 (2010).
4

injunctions. Injunctions already protect the public
from unfair or deceptive practices. Congress put
thoughtful restraints on FTC efforts to seek
monetary relief. Section 19 recites those restraints,
which the FTC evades each time it seeks monetary
remedies under Section 13(b) alone.3
This Court’s precedents, discussed below,
require first discerning the statutory purpose of the
enactments in question.
I.
Congress Inserted Injunctions into One
FTC Act Section, and Monetary Remedies into
Another
Congress added Section 13(b) to the FTC Act
as part of the Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline
Authorization Act of 1973. P.L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat.
592 (1973). This section was added primarily as a
bandage, allowing the FTC to enjoin defendants’
deceptive practices pending an administrative
proceeding. See Beales & Muris, supra n.1, at 6-21
(containing an extensive discussion of statutory
purpose and history of the FTC Act and its
amendments). Prior to this, a defendant could

Reporting on the Fourth Circuit decision here, the
National Law Journal described this dispute as
“high-stakes,” since the lower court’s adoption of the
FTC’s arguments meant that “a key part in [its]
‘arsenal’ . . . [escaped a] potentially devastating
challenge.” See Jenna Greene, Court Lets FTC Keep
Its Big Gun, Nat’l L.J. (March 3, 2014). No one can
debate the national importance of this issue.
3

5

continue to injure consumers before an FTC internal
“cease and desist order” proceeding concluded.
Both the legislative history and the larger
statutory scheme confirm the limited purpose of this
amendment. A Senate Report addressing what was
to become Section 13(b) stated:
The purpose of [Section 13(b)] is to
permit the Commission to bring an
immediate halt to unfair or deceptive
acts or practices when to do so would be
in the public interest. At the present
time such practices might continue for
several years until agency action is
completed. Victimization of American
consumers should not be so shielded.
[Section 13(b)] authorizes the granting
of a temporary restraining order or a
preliminary injunction without bond
pending the issuance of a complaint by
the Commission under Section 5 . . . .
S. Rep. No. 93-151, at 30-31 (1973) (emphasis
added).4 In the House discussion on Section 13(b),
Representative Smith noted that “[i]t is only good
sense that where there is a probability that the act
will eventually be found illegal and the perpetrator
Although Section 13(b) was passed as part of the
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act in 1973, it
was originally introduced as part of and was
discussed in the legislative history of the Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act. P.L. No. 93637, 88 Stat. 2201 (1975).
4

6

ordered to cease, that some method be available to
protect innocent third parties while the litigation
winds its way through final decision.” 119 Cong. Rec.
36608-9 (Nov. 12, 1973). Furthermore, a 1974 House
Report, written just after passage of Section 13(b),
set out the purpose of the amendment:
Both the Nader and ABA reports
recommended that the FTC be
empowered to obtain preliminary
injunctions against unfair or deceptive
acts or practices which are unfair or
deceptive to consumers. This authority
was granted by Section 408 of the
Alaska Pipeline Act [Section 13(b)] . . . .
H.R. Rep. No. 93-1107, at 7716 (1974).
Former FTC Chair Timothy J. Muris, in his
scholarly writing, recently criticized courts for
ignoring the “rich and nuanced debate that produced
the 1970’s amendments to the FTC Act,” concluding
that “[n]either the FTC nor Congress thought that
the changes to Section 13 solved the FTC’s need for
greater remedial authority, which led to the passage
of Sections 19 and 5(m)(1)(B) in 1975.” Beales &
Muris, supra n.1, at 6. He notes that “[w]hat little
debate there was evinces no indication that anyone
understood the [Section 13(b)] provision to do
anything other than confer on the agency the
authority to seek injunctive relief to end practices
while administrative proceedings were on-going.” Id.
at 14-15. The FTC on its own accord decided to read
this interpretation into the statute years later. Id. at
22-28.
7

Chair Muris notes that “if Section 13(b)
allowed the FTC to go into court to seek consumer
redress routinely, the FTC could have used Section
13(b) with or without the issuance of a cease-anddesist order.” Id. at 17. “Tellingly, the debate over
redress did not stop.” Id. at 16.
In 1975, only two years after the passage of
Section 13(b), Congress amended the FTC Act to
include Section 19.5 This Section permits the FTC to
bring civil actions against parties only after it has
gone through the administrative process and issued
a final cease-and-desist letter. 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b).
While the relief granted in Section 13(b) cases is
limited to injunctions, Section 19(b) (repeated here)
explicitly includes monetary relief:
The court in an action under subsection
(a) of this section shall have jurisdiction
to grant such relief as the court finds
necessary
to
redress
injury
to
consumers
or
other
persons,
Both Sections 13(b) and 19(b) were originally
introduced during the same session of Congress. See
S. Rep. No. 93-151, at 27-31 (Origins of Section 19(b)
introduced as “Consumer Redress (section 203),” and
origins of Section 13(b) introduced as “Injunctions
(section 210)”). Section 19(b) was passed in 1975 as
part of the Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act. P.L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975). However,
the fact that both Sections were originally
contemplated together provides additional evidence
that Sections 13(b) and 19(b) were meant to address
separate issues.
5
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partnerships,
and
corporations
resulting from the rule violation or the
unfair or deceptive act or practice, as
the case may be. Such relief may
include, but shall not be limited to,
rescission or reformation of contracts,
the refund of money or return of
property, the payment of damages, and
public notification respecting the rule
violation or the unfair or deceptive act
or practice, as the case may be . . . .
15 U.S.C. § 57b(b) (emphasis added). The difference
in wording between Sections 13(b) and 19(b) is clear.
Section 13(b) lays out an exhaustive list limiting
relief to temporary restraining orders, preliminary
injunctions, and permanent injunctions. 15 U.S.C. §
53(b). Section 19(b), in contrast, provides a nonexhaustive list (“such relief may include, but shall not
be limited to”) that explicitly permits the FTC to seek
monetary relief. 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b).
“During debates in both the Senate and the
House, the members of Congress who spoke on the
floor again seemed to be of the view that Section 19
was giving the FTC significant, new authority.”
Beales & Muris, supra n.1, at 19-20. Their conduct in
enacting Section 19 suggests that members of
Congress were ignorant of the possibility that
Section 13 (which the same Congress had just
recently passed) already gave the FTC broad redress
authority. Id. at 20. This and the rest of the
“legislative history, viewed in its entirety, provides
the ‘inescapable inference’ that Congress did not

9

intend the injunctive relief provision to swallow the
monetary relief provision.” Id. at 21.
II.
The Multi-Decade Evolution of the FTC’s
Strategy to Use Section 13(b) to Seek Monetary
Remedies
At first, the FTC did not seek monetary
remedies under Section 13(b). But in the early
1980’s, the FTC developed what it termed the
“Section 13(b) Fraud Program.” Id. at 22-23. The
Fraud Program started by convincing the Seventh
and Ninth Circuits that the “preliminary injunction”
language of Section 13(b) permitted an asset freeze
at the outset of litigation. Id. However, even
acquiring Section 13(b) asset freeze powers was not
enough from the FTC’s perspective. The FTC
perceived that it would be a “clunky, multi-step
process” to use three different actions against
defendants: first, a Section 13(b) asset freeze in
court; second, a Section 19 proceeding in the FTC to
obtain a cease-and-desist order; and third, years
later, a Section 19 court action to seek consumer
redress. Id. The FTC thus began to rely on this
Court’s precedent, Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328
U.S. 395 (1946), to argue for monetary remedies as
part of the inherent equitable powers “presumed” to
reside within the enactment of Section 13(b). Id. at
24-25. This use of Section 13(b) avoided the
inconvenience
to
the
FTC
of
respecting
Congressional limitations on FTC power inserted
into Section 19: a statute of limitations, a causation
requirement, and a prior cease-and-desist order
requirement.
10

But as discussed in more detail below, “Porter
made clear that Congress need not grant the courts
full equitable jurisdiction if doing so would be
inconsistent with Congress’s intended statutory
scheme.” Id. at 25. Meghrig v. KFC Western, also
discussed below, solidifies this conclusion. Thus, the
analysis required by Porter and its progeny ought to
have required the FTC and its chosen courts to
discern Congressional intent. Id. Yet, courts allowing
the FTC its desired Section 13(b) scope “have not
considered the legislative history of Section 13(b) and
the 1975 amendments to the FTC Act.” Id. at 26. Nor
have they properly considered the manifestation of
Congressional intent embodied in the respective
1973 and 1975 enactments themselves.
III.

The District Court Proceedings

The FTC brought this case on December 2,
2008, alleging a scheme to “exploit[] consumers’
legitimate concerns about Internet-based threats like
spyware and viruses by issuing false security or
privacy warnings to consumers for the sole purpose
of selling software to fix the imagined problem.”
(Complaint ¶15). The Complaint alleged a “common
enterprise” among several corporate entities,
including Innovative Marketing, Inc. (Complaint ¶7).
The FTC also named Petitioner Kristy Ross, the
company’s one-time Vice President of Business
Development.
The Complaint alleged violations of Section
5(a) (15 U.S.C. § 45(a)), and asserted the FTC’s
power as a federal agency to bring a court action
solely under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act (15 U.S.C.
11

§ 53(b)). (Complaint ¶1; App. at 17a). The FTC had
not commenced an administrative complaint within
the FTC that might have led to a cease-and-desist
order under Section 5(b) (15 U.S.C. § 45(b)). Thus,
the FTC had done nothing that might trigger a
possibility of consumer redress under Section 19.
After several persons and entities defaulted,
the district court entered default judgments on
February 24, 2009. Judgment was not entered
against Petitioner Ross, who by then had appeared to
defend and clear her name. Eventually, all codefendants who had not defaulted settled with the
FTC, except for Petitioner Ross.
The district court denied an FTC summary
judgment motion and set the matter for trial. A twoday bench trial commenced on September 11, 2012.
As a consequence of prior court rulings, Ms. Ross was
precluded from presenting evidence of nondeceptiveness. Only a single witness testified in
person, a witness who had never met or spoken to
Ms. Ross. Testimony took up only eighteen of the 242
pages of trial transcript, mostly to authenticate a
document for the FTC. Most of the trial consisted of
opening statements and closing arguments (the other
224 pages).
On September 24, 2012, the district court
issued its judgment, along with its memorandum
opinion containing findings and conclusions. The
district court found Ms. Ross liable under Section
13(b) for the same $163 million in monetary
remedies as in the default judgments, and issued a
permanent injunction against her involvement in
computer security software. (App. at 50a-53a). The
FTC immediately issued a press release boasting of
12

the $163 million judgment. See Press Release,
Federal Trade Commission, FTC Case Results in
$163 Million Judgment against “Scareware”
Marketer (Oct. 2, 2012) (Published by the FTC at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/10/winfixer.shtm,
last
visited May 16, 2014). An appeal followed.
IV.

The Fourth Circuit’s Decision

Ms. Ross presented five grounds for reversal,
only one of which is addressed in this Petition.6
The Fourth Circuit agreed with Petitioner
Ross that Section 13(b)’s statutory “text does not
expressly authorize the award of consumer redress.”
(App. at 5a). It went on, however, to analyze the
scope of the court’s equitable jurisdiction in light of
Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946)
and Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361
U.S. 288 (1960). (App. at 5a).
Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit failed to
acknowledge that Porter compels that unstated
equity remedies do not exist when there is a
“necessary and inescapable inference” that Congress
did not grant the full scope of equity jurisdiction.
Porter, 328 U.S. at 397-98. Nor did the Fourth
Circuit acknowledge that Mitchell restated this

Petitioner Ross does not directly petition for review
of the Fourth Circuit’s decision on the standard for
individual monetary liability, though it, too, is
entirely absent from the plain words of the FTC Act.
6
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principle.7 Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 291. Instead, the
Fourth Circuit quoted out of context Porter’s
statement that the “comprehensiveness of this
equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied or limited in
the absence of a clear and valid legislative
command.” (App. at 5a). Under this seemingly higher
standard, the Fourth Circuit searched for a such a
“command,” and claimed that it found none. (App. at
5a-7a). However, Porter defined how such a
“command” may be embodied – as a “necessary and
inescapable inference” (328 U.S. at 398) revealed
through statutory purpose (328 U.S. at 400).
The Fourth Circuit also claimed that
Petitioner
Ross
failed
to
present
“some
countervailing indication sufficient to rebut the
presumption” that monetary consumer redress is
allowed under Section 13(b). (App. at 5a). Instead,
the Fourth Circuit created a straw man to represent
Petitioner Ross’s argument. The Fourth Circuit
labored under the misimpression that Petitioner
Ross was arguing that the absence of Porter’s “other
order” language sealed the outcome here. The Fourth
Circuit thus held that the absence of “magic words”
that had permitted full equitable remedies in Porter
(namely, the text “other order” after text about
injunctions) did not suffice. (App. at 6a). The problem
is, that was not Petitioner Ross’s argument (as
shown below).

Though Petitioner Ross cited and applied Meghrig
v. KFC Western prominently in her briefing, the
Fourth Circuit ignored that decision as well.
7
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The Fourth Circuit proceeded to declare that
this Court in Mitchell “significantly expanded
Porter’s holding.” (App. at 6a). As perceived by the
Fourth Circuit, even though the “other order”
language from Porter was absent in Mitchell, “the
Court held that ordering reimbursement was
nevertheless permissible under Porter.” (App. at 7a).
In so doing, the Fourth Circuit failed to recognize
how Mitchell actually clarified Porter. The Fourth
Circuit decision appears to overlook that Mitchell
turned on analysis of “statutory purpose.” Only a
“statutory purpose” analysis may properly answer
the question whether Congress implies nontextual
equity remedies sub silentio when expressly
mentioning only injunctive powers. Mitchell, 361
U.S. at 291-92.
The Fourth Circuit gave short shrift to
Petitioner’s actual arguments. Without providing
their details, the Fourth Circuit labeled them “a
series of arguments about how the structure, history,
and purpose of the Federal Trade Commission Act
weigh against the conclusion that district courts
have the authority to award consumer redress.”
(App. at 7a). The Fourth Circuit offered no rationale
for rejecting these arguments. It indeed praised them
as “not entirely unpersuasive.” (App. at 7a).
The Fourth Circuit then exhibited a rare case
of jurisprudential vertigo. It recognized that
respecting Petitioner Ross’s arguments would
“obliterate a significant part of the Commission’s
remedial arsenal . . . [and] would foresake almost
thirty years of federal appellate decisions and create
a circuit conflict.” (App. at 8a). By ruling against her,
the Fourth Circuit actually deepened a circuit
15

conflict far more encompassing than a single-issue
conflict, by departing from the District of Columbia
Circuit’s United States v. Philip Morris decision.
This Petition does not seek to overturn the
Fourth Circuit’s affirmance of liability under the
FTC Act, or the entry of an injunction against
Petitioner Ross. The Petition instead requests review
of the statutory authority of the district court to
award any monetary remedy under Section 13(b).
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
I.
The Fourth Circuit Blindly Followed
Prior Circuit Decisions that Incorrectly
Ignored the Impact of Meghrig and Evidence of
Statutory
Purpose,
Each
of
Which
Independently Forecloses Monetary Remedies
under Section 13(b)
This Court has noted that “where Congress
includes particular language in one section of a
statute but omits it in another . . . it is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”
Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208
(1993) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S.
16, 23 (1983)). Congress passed Section 19(b) to
grant the FTC powers which it did not previously
have. To assume otherwise would be to accuse
Congress of passing a largely superfluous
amendment after two years of legislative
deliberation. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct.
3218, 3228-29 (2010) (explaining the statutory canon
that courts should not “interpret[] any statutory
16

provision in a manner that would render another
provision superfluous,” even when “Congress enacted
the provisions at different times”) (internal citations
omitted).
It is also an elementary principle of
administrative law that agencies have only the
power that Congress grants them. See, e.g., Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988)
(“It is axiomatic that an administrative agency’s
power . . . is limited to the authority delegated by
Congress.”).8 Agencies should not read authority into
statutes where none exists. “[I]f we were to ‘presume
a delegation of power’ from the absence of ‘an express
withholding of such power, agencies would enjoy
virtually limitless hegemony . . . .’” American Bar
Ass’n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 468 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(quoting Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n v. Nat’l Mediation
Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 571 (D.C. Cir. 1994)) (en banc)
(emphasis in original).
Despite these foundational principles, in the
40 years since its Congressional enactment, the FTC
has transformed Section 13(b) from an injunctive tool
into a powerful weapon for monetary remedies and
business-settlement extractions, contrary to the
In the Federalist No. 14, James Madison wrote of
the limited government and enumerated powers
implied under our Constitution: “In the first place it
is to be remembered that the general [federal]
government is not to be charged with the whole
power of making and administering laws. Its
jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects.
. . .” The Federalist No. 14, at 61 (James Madison)
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003).
8

17

specific intent of Congress and the manifest
statutory purpose.
The plain text of Section 13(b) is clear, and
provides only for the granting of injunctive relief.
The heading of Section 13(b) is “Temporary
restraining orders; preliminary injunctions.” 15
U.S.C. § 53(b). Section 13(b) uses precise wording: “a
temporary restraining order or a preliminary
injunction may be granted without bond,” and in the
final proviso, “[in] proper cases the Commission may
seek, and after proper proof, the court may issue, a
permanent injunction.” 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (emphasis
added). The fact that Congress expressly enumerated
the types of relief available precludes the reading in
of monetary remedies. See, e.g., Reyes-Gaona v.
North Carolina Growers Ass’n, 250 F.3d 861, 865
(4th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he doctrine of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius instructs that where a law expressly
describes a particular situation to which it shall
apply, what was omitted or excluded was intended to
be omitted or excluded”); see also Lamie v. United
States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 537 (2004) (“courts
should not add an ‘absent word’ to a statute;” “there
is a basic difference between filling a gap left by
Congress’ silence and rewriting rules that Congress
has affirmatively and specifically enacted.”).
Here, if Congress intended the FTC to wield
all equitable remedies within its 1973 enactment of
Section 13(b), it knew how to do so. Instead, it used
plain, limiting language. Courts have long recognized
that within such plain language, injunctions,

18

restitution, and disgorgement are each subspecies of
the larger category of equitable remedies.9
Even if the intent of Section 13(b) were not
clear from its plain text, the legislative history
provides ample evidence of its purpose as a stopgap
measure.
As
discussed
extensively
above
(STATEMENT OF THE CASE, Section I), and
confirmed by a former Chair of the FTC and other

Countless court decisions treat the word
“injunction” as separate from “restitution” or
“disgorgement,” and treat them all as subspecies of
“equitable remedies.” E.g., SEC v. Jasper, 678 F.3d
1116, 1130 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Defendant notes that
‘[f]orfeiture and penalties are legal remedies, as
compared to equitable remedies like restitution,
disgorgement, and injunctions.’”); Horvath v.
Keystone Health Plan E., Inc., 333 F.3d 450, 455-56
(3d Cir. 2003) (plaintiff established a case or
controversy as to her request for injunctive relief but
failed to do so with respect to requests for restitution
and disgorgement); Tourgeman v. Collins Fin. Servs.,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54036, at *15 (S.D. Cal. 2012)
(“Plaintiff's Reply also concedes for the first time
that he is not entitled to restitution, and thus seeks
only injunctive relief on behalf of the UCL class.”);
Jackson v. Truck Drivers' Union Local 42 Health &
Welfare Fund, 933 F. Supp. 1124, 1136 (D. Mass.
1996) (Section 502(a)(3) provides only for “equitable
relief” and a suit to recover plan losses was not “a
remedy traditionally viewed as ‘equitable,’ such as
injunction or restitution”).
9
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scholars,10 Congress did not enact Section 13(b) in
1973 to empower the FTC to seek monetary
remedies. It granted the power to seek monetary
remedies, with significant limitations and after years
of legislative debate, through the 1975 enactment of
Section 19.
The FTC has enjoyed success for 30 years in
arguing in the lower courts that the “injunction”
remedies recited in Section 13(b) invoke any and all
of the court’s inherent equity powers. The first
appellate decision to infer ancillary relief (wrongly)
into the clear wording of Section 13(b) was FTC v.
Singer, 668 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1982). That court
found that “unless otherwise provided by statute, all
the inherent equitable powers of the District Court
are available for the proper and complete exercise of
that jurisdiction.” 668 F.2d at 1112 (quoting Porter,
328 U.S. at 398). It further found that “unless a
statute in so many words, or by a necessary and
inescapable
inference,
restricts
the
court’s
jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that
jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied.” Id.
(quoting Porter, 328 U.S. at 398). It reasoned that
because Section 19 contained a “savings clause”
stating that its remedies were in addition to and not
in lieu of any other remedy provided under the FTC
Act, and that “[n]othing in this section shall be
construed to affect any authority of the Commission
under any other provision of law,” it could not be
inferred that Congress had explicitly acted to restrict
Beales & Muris, supra n.1, at 6-21; Ward, supra
n.2, at 1174-94; Thurman & Mallow, supra n.2, at
305-15.
10
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the full scope of equitable remedies in Section 13(b).
Id. at 1113.
Section 13(b) may not be construed so broadly,
and may not be expanded by judicial fiat to play the
role that Section 19 plays in the overall statutory
program.
First, the savings clause should be viewed as
legally irrelevant. To say that a 1975 enactment
should not be interpreted to “limit” a 1973 enactment
merely begs the question of what the 1973 enactment
meant at the time of its passage. Section 19 should
not be understood to limit the FTC’s authority to
seek consumer redress under Section 13(b), but
rather its existence suggests that no such authority
was ever granted. Beales & Muris, supra n.1, at 26.
A savings clause such as this one merely preserves
causes of action and remedies that already existed
and do not conflict. Id.; see also, Pennsylvania R.R.
Co. v. Sonman Shaft Coal Co., 242 U.S. 120, 123
(1916).
Second, Congress made an express grant of
power to seek monetary remedies in Section 19(b) –
Section 13(b)’s sister provision. The Singer court’s
interpretation renders Section 19(b) superfluous. See
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228-29. By comparison, this
Court in Meghrig v. KFC Western stated that where
“Congress has provided ‘elaborate enforcement
provisions’ for remedying the violation of a federal
statute . . . it cannot be assumed that Congress
intended to authorize by implication additional
judicial remedies . . . .”11 516 U.S. at 487-88.
The Court went so far as to state that “it is an
elementary canon of statutory construction that
11
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In accord with this Court’s pronouncements in
Meghrig, Sections 13(b) and 19(b) work in concert to
provide such elaborate enforcement provisions. They
designate the specific types of relief granted under
each, and the specific set of facts that must exist in
order to grant such relief. Congress did not pass each
provision ignorant of the other.
The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit has split from the FTC-friendly
circuits by recognizing the limits of inferring judicial
equitable power. In United States v. Philip Morris
USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1192 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 546 U.S. 960 (2005), the court found that the
equitable remedy of disgorgement went above and
beyond the equitable relief provided by the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The court
acknowledged the command of Porter granting courts
a wide equitable berth, but was careful to read the
wording of the federal statute so as not to run astray
of Congressional intent. Id. at 1197. Stating that
courts may only “assume broad equitable powers
when the statutory or Constitutional grant of power
is equally broad,” the court noted that the reliefgranting statutory language in Porter was broad (the
court was permitted to grant “a permanent
injunction, restraining order, or other order” when
deciding what relief to grant under the Emergency
Price Control Act). Id. at 1198 (emphasis added).
where a statute expressly provides a particular
remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading
others into it.” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 488 (quoting
TransAmerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc., v. Lewis, 444
U.S. 11, 19 (1979)).
22

Because “other order[s]” were permitted, the court
found in that case it was “not a stretch” to read broad
equitable relief into what the statute permitted. Id.;
accord Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing
Co., Inc., 415 U.S. 1, 19 (1974) (explaining that
Porter upheld broad equitable power “not only
because of the presence of the ‘other order’ language,
but because of the ‘traditional equity powers of a
court.’”) (emphasis added) (citing Porter).12
The language in Porter differs materially from
the language in Philip Morris, and here. Nowhere in
Section 13(b) does the statutory wording permit
“other order,” or “other relief.” In fact, the equitable
relief granted is specifically enumerated, and only
includes
“temporary
restraining
orders,”
“preliminary
injunctions,”
and
“permanent
Before the Fourth Circuit did in this case, other
courts have misinterpreted Mitchell as rendering
irrelevant the “other order” language in Porter,
contrary to this Court’s explanation of Porter in
Bannercraft, 415 U.S. at 19. E.g., FTC v. Bronson
Partners LLC, 654 F.3d 359, 365-67 (2d Cir. 2011).
Even a superficial review shows that the rationale in
Porter for permitting wide monetary relief was based
on the existence of “other order” in the list of
statutory authorizations. Porter, 328 U.S. at 399 (“An
order for the recovery and restitution of illegal rents
may be considered a proper ‘other order’ on either of
two theories: . . . .”). Often what the lower courts cite
within Porter when granting the FTC broad powers
under Section 13(b) comes from the following
paragraphs containing the two theories why “other
order” language implies broad equitable powers.
12
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injunctions.” 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). In contrast, Section
19(b) resembles the language of the statute in Porter,
in that it expressly provides that the enumerated
remedies “shall include, but shall not be limited to,”
specific types of monetary relief. 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b).
In addition, the court in Philip Morris engaged the
canons of noscitur a sociis and eijusdem generis to
find that a list of explicit remedies in a statute
should only be expanded, if at all, “with remedies
similar in nature to those enumerated.” 396 F.3d at
1200. Stating that the remedies explicitly provided in
the statute were all directed at future conduct, the
court found that disgorgement, which is meant to
remedy past harm, could not properly be inferred as
an additional equitable remedy. Id.
The parallels to Section 13(b) are striking. As
has been stated both in the legislative history and by
courts alike (including the Singer court, which
nonetheless expanded the scope of Section 13(b)’s
equitable relief to include monetary relief), the
purpose of Section 13(b) is to maintain the status
quo, a forward-looking remedy. In contrast,
consumer redress is backward-looking relief intended
to remedy past consumer harm.
Finally, like other courts before it, the Fourth
Circuit’s silence on Meghrig v. KFC Western reveals
the inadequacy of past legal analyses. The Fourth
Circuit did not cite or discuss Meghrig, where this
Court unanimously held that courts lack “equitable
restitution” powers under the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA). Id., 516 U.S. at 481-88
(denying past cost recovery for waste cleanup).
Meghrig distinguished the United States’ attempt (as
amicus curiae) to apply Porter to evidence
24

restitutionary power within remedies that Megrig
labeled (id. at 484) a “prohibitive injunction” and a
“mandatory injunction.” Id. at 487-88. Meghrig
compared
RCRA
to
the
Comprehensive
Environmental
Recovery
and
Cleanup
Act
(CERCLA),
and
concluded,
“Congress
thus
demonstrated in CERCLA that it knew how to
provide for the recovery of cleanup costs, and that
the language used to define the remedies under
RCRA does not provide that remedy.” Id. at 485.
Meghrig’s distinction from Porter applies with
equal force here. The Court observed, “the limited
remedies described in [RCRA], along with the stark
differences between the language of [the RCRA
injunction] section and the cost recovery provisions of
CERCLA, amply demonstrate that Congress did not
intend [equitable restitution] under RCRA.” Id. at
487. This analysis applies fully to Sections 13(b) and
19(b). Section 13(b) remedies compare with RCRA’s
injunction provisions, while Section 19(b) remedies
compare with CERCLA’s explicit cost recovery
provisions. To reword the key part of Meghrig
accordingly, “Congress thus demonstrated in [Section
19(b)] that it knew how to provide for [consumer
redress], and that the language used to define the
remedies under [Section 13(b)] does not provide that
remedy.” Id. at 485.
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II.
The Issue is Fully Percolated, With No
Circuit Court Having Performed a Proper
Analysis of Statutory Purpose, and With No
Circuit Court Having Cited or Distinguished
Meghrig
The monetary relief issue is fully percolated,
and the decision below is already being used to
stretch FTC powers even more. Just this month, the
Government filed a brief in this Court citing the
decision below. Brief for the Respondant in
Opposition, Publishers Business Services, Inc. v. FTC
(Case No. 13-1045) (May 2014) (“Government’s PBS
Brief”). The Government’s PBS Brief boasts that “the
courts of appeals have uniformly held that, upon a
showing by the FTC that a defendant has engaged in
‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices’ in violation of
15 U.S.C. 45, the district courts may order not only
prospective injunctive relief, but also ancillary
remedies, including equitable monetary relief, to
achieve complete justice.” Id. at 9.13
After spending two pages fighting this issue,
the Government’s PBS Brief strangely acknowledges
Contrary to the Government’s suggestion, a
longstanding statutory misapplication does not
immunize such an error from this Court’s review. See
Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177, 191 (1994), superseded on
other grounds by 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (1995) (overruling
sixty years of allowance of a statutory cause of action
because Congress had not expressly provided for that
cause of action).
13
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that “Petitioners do not dispute that equitable
monetary relief can be awarded under Section 13(b).”
Id. at 11. As Lady MacBeth “doth protest too much,”
so too does the Government.
The Government’s PBS Brief at note 1
purports to catalog the decisions of the circuit courts
supporting its position. None of the Government’s
authorities (nor the one additional authority cited by
the Fourth Circuit below) performed the proper
analysis required by Porter and its progeny,
especially Meghrig. This section addresses each such
circuit court decision in turn:
FTC v. Ross, 743 F.3d 886, 891 (4th Cir.
2014): As already discussed, the Ross decision (this
case) conducted no analysis of statutory purpose of
Section 13(b), and did not cite or analyze Meghrig,
nothwithstanding that decision’s centrality to
Petitioner’s arguments below.
FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 F.3d
359, 366 (2d Cir. 2011): The Bronson Partners
decision does not cite or acknowledge Meghrig. It
also erroneously states that Mitchell “made clear”
that the Porter Court’s significance given to the
“other order” language was not, in fact, tied to the
“other order” language. 654 F.3d at 366. That is
wrong, since Porter itself states that the monetary
remedy under review “may be considered a proper
‘other order’ on either of two theories,” and goes on to
state what they were. Porter, 328 U.S. at 399; see
also supra, n.12; Bannercraft, 415 U.S. at 19
(explaining “the presence of the ‘other order’
language” as one reason why Porter “upheld broad
equitable power.”).
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The Bronson Partners decision nonetheless
contends there to be a rationale for liberating the
Porter ratio decendi from the “other order” language,
supposedly finding that rationale in Mitchell. 654
F.3d at 366. But Mitchell did no such thing. Mitchell
instead simply found statutory purpose evidence
equivalent to Porter’s “other order” language in the
facts at bar. Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 291-92 (finding
that “complete relief in light of the statutory
purposes” that will “give effect to the policy of the
legislature” must include compensation for wrongful
retaliatory discharge because “fear of economic
retaliation might often operate to induce aggrieved
employees
quietly
to
accept
substandard
conditions.”). Mitchell observed that the monetary
relief in question bolstered the statutory purposes
because “[w]e cannot read the Act as presenting
those it sought to protect with what is little more
than a Hobson’s choice.” Id. at 293. In its conclusion,
Mitchell underscored that its discernment of the
power to award a particular kind of limited monetary
relief (reimbursement for lost wages due to wrongful
retaliatory discharge) was based on “what we have
found to be the statutory purposes.” Id. at 296.
The Bronson Partners decision materially
miscites Mitchell in this regard. It contended that
Mitchell reads Porter to allow wide ancillary
remedies “as necessary to afford complete relief.” 654
F.2d at 366. However, Bronson Partners ended the
quotation too soon. Mitchell’s actual words are
“complete relief in light of the staututory purposes.”
Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292 (emphasis added). As
discussed above, the manifest statutory purpose of
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Section 13(b) was solely limited to injunctive relief,
without further monetary remedies.
FTC v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, Inc., 624
F.3d 1, 14-15 (1st Cir. 2010): Direct Marketing
Concepts is inapposite. Appellant did not challenge
the availability of monetary remedies vel non. Thus,
the First Circuit performed no analysis of whether
monetary remedies are available under Section
13(b), but rather resolved disputes as to what kind.
Id.
FTC v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d
1192, 1202 n.6 (10th Cir. 2005): As with Direct
Marketing, the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Freecom
Communications did not include any challenge to the
availability of monetary relief under Section 13(b). If
anything, it is even less apposite since there was not
any dispute as to the kinds of monetary remedies
available.
FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 468
(11th Cir. 1996): As with Direct Marketing and
Freecom Communications, the Appellant in Gem
Merchandising did not challenge the availability of
monetary relief under Section 13(b). Gem
Merchandising is more akin to Direct Marketing,
since the dispute centered solely on the type of
monetary remedies permitted. The appellant agreed
that consumer redress was allowed, but argued
(unsuccessfully) that disgorgement was a penalty
and not redress, and that payment into the United
States Treasury was disallowed. 87 F.3d at 468-69.
While the Eleventh Circuit cited Porter in addressing
the questions presented, the court did not consider or
analyze the statutory purpose of Section 13(b).
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FTC v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1102
(9th Cir. 1994): As with Direct Marketing, Freecom
Communications and Gem Merchandising, the Ninth
Circuit’s Pantron I decision contains no indication
that the appellant challenged the availability of
monetary relief under Section 13(b) vel non. Instead,
with all parties apparently assuming that such relief
was permissible, the Pantron I court addressed
whether the lower court erred in finding that the
FTC had not proven consumer injury caused by
adjudged misrepresentations. 33 F.3d at 1102.
FTC v. Security Rare Coin & Bullion
Corp., 931 F.2d 1312, 1314-15 (8th Cir. 1991)
(cited by decision below, but not cited in
Government’s PBS Brief): The Eighth Circuit in
Security Rare Coin also found the availability of
monetary remedies under Section 13(b), but did not
consider that Section’s statutory purpose. In a
decision that predated Meghrig, the court concluded
without much analysis that “[n]othing in the wording
of the statute expressly precludes ancillary equitable
relief.” 931 F.2d at 1314. While Security Rare Coin
did address the existence of Section 19, it wrongly
concluded that the savings clause in Section 19(e)
nullified any significance for interpreting Section
13(b): “There can be no inference from this language
that Congress intended section 19 to restrict the
broad equitable jurisdiction granted to the district
court by section 13(b).” Id. at 1315. As discussed
above in Argument Section I, the savings clause
cannot be read this way to brush aside parts of a
comprehensive regulatory program, particularly in
light of the extensive legislative history leading up to
the enactment of Section 19. Like every other court,
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the Eighth Circuit ignored that history, as well as
the statutory purpose manifested in the respective
enactments themselves.
FTC v. Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d
564, 571 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 954
(1989): Finally, the Amy Travel decision also lacks
any analysis of statutory purpose, and also predates
this Court’s Meghrig decision. The Seventh Circuit
relied on one of its prior decisions concerning
preliminary injunctions under Section 13(b) to
expand dicta concerning monetary remedies to
permanent injunctions under Section 13(b). 875 F.2d
at 571. In its prior decision (FTC v. World Travel
Vacation Brokers, Inc., 861 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir.
1988)), the appellant did not contest the availability
of ancillary equitable remedies, including an asset
freeze, under Section 13(b). Rather, the appellant
contested whether a preliminary injunction
proceeding was allowed at all in a case filed by the
FTC under the last proviso of Section 13(b), which
solely mentions permanent injunctions. World
Travel, 861 F.2d at 1025-26 (holding that the final
proviso is not limited to permanent injunctions
despite its text). Thus, when the Seventh Circuit
based its Amy Travel decision on World Travel, it
eschewed any analysis whatsoever of statutory
purpose, and gave stare decisis effect to previouslynondisputed dictum.
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III. This Case Provides an Ideal Vehicle to
Stop the FTC’s Abuse of Power
For the first time since before Meghrig,14 this
case squarely presents the question of the FTC’s
authority to seek monetary remedies under Section
13(b). The question has fully percolated through
most of the circuit courts. It is a question of
exceptional importance, rarely arising before this
Court because of the immense settlement pressures
imposed by the very tactics that this Petition
addresses. This case also provides an opportunity for
this Court to resolve an inconsistency in the circuits’
application of this Court’s Porter decision.
A.
The Exceptional Importance of Confining
FTC Activities to Their Proper Statutory Scope
The FTC must believe it has a green light to
misuse its authority since it filed over 300
complaints under Section 13(b) seeking monetary
relief between 2007 and 2013. (App. at 54a). The
FTC boasts over $2 billion in actual or potential
proceeds in this period from such efforts. (App. at
54a).
While
the
frequency
and
monetary
consequences alone of this government overreach
signal the extraordinary need for review, there is
more.
Ironically, it was the Fourth Circuit that
warned about agency creep, observing that
“government agencies have a tendency to swell, not
This Court denied certiorari on this issue in Amy
Travel, 493 U.S. 954 (1989).
14
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shrink, and are likely to have an expansive view of
their mission.” Brown & Williamson Tobacco v. FDA,
153 F.3d 155, 162 (4th Cir. 1998), aff’d 529 U.S. 120
(2000) (citation omitted). The federal court system
has been unusually tolerant of the FTC’s expanding
mandate, based in part on “weak research” by federal
courts and “sympathy” for its mission. Roach, supra
n.2, at 1309. That tolerance has now raised alarm
bells from unexpected quarters.
Having received no resistance to its
nonstatutory assertion of monetary remedy powers
under Section 13(b), the FTC has now expanded its
activities beyond the “Fraud Program” mentioned
earlier. The FTC is now using its enforcement
authority under Section 13(b) against well known
companies who are themselves victims of fraud. This
new tack appears most prominently within the FTC’s
use of Section 13(b) against retailers and hotel
chains victimized by data breaches, having allegedly
failed to maintain reasonable and appropriate data
security for consumers’ personal information.
The District of New Jersey granted the latest
green light to the FTC, over the objections of twelve
substantial district court amici, including the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America, the American Hotel & Lodging Association,
Public Citizen, the National Federation of
Independent Business and TechFreedom. See FTC v.
Wyndham Worldwide Corp., __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47622, at *10 n.3 (D.N.J. 2014)
(denying motion to dismiss; listing amici). In
Wyndham, the hotel chain and its amici were unable
to obtain dismissal, even though the FTC lacked
express statutory authority to regulate in the data
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security context, and had issued neither formal
regulations on the subject nor guidance adequate to provide
fair notice. Id. It is no stretch to realize that the FTC’s
self-granted authority puts legitimate, victimized
companies at risk of massive monetary liabilities
without any protections that Section 19 should
provide. Such monetary liabilities might be sought
in, at best, the outer edge of the FTC’s proper area of
activity.15
Circuit court decisions allowing the FTC to
extract monetary remedies under Section 13(b) have
now been used to justify expanding equitable relief
under other injunction-only statutes. For example,
the Tenth Circuit cited FTC Act cases to justify
injecting monetary remedies into injunction-only
provisions of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21
U.S.C. § 301, et seq. United States v. RX Depot, Inc.,
438 F.3d 1052, 1054-63 (10th Cir. 2006) (rejecting
argument that Meghrig limits Porter/Mitchell). The
Sixth Circuit did the same in United States v.
Universal Management Services, Inc., 191 F.3d 750,
760-62 (6th Cir. 1999). This distinct area of federal
regulatory law, outside of FTC jurisdiction, would
benefit from this Court’s clarification of the scope of
Porter and Mitchell in view of Meghrig.

Sometimes the FTC’s misuse of Section 13(b) sets
in motion a sequence of events leading to the target’s
loss of liberty, such as has happened when a former
FTC target allegedly violated a cooercive consent
decree, triggering contempt proceedings.
15
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B.
The Rarity of Opportunities to Review
This Fully Percolated Issue
The FTC structured the Fraud Program in a
way that dissuades defendants from vindicating
their rights through litigation. These tactics rely on
the overreaching interpretation of Section 13(b)
exposed in this Petition, tactics calculated to
circumvent the Congressionally-devised defendant
protections of Section 19. Very few FTC litigants
have ever had the capacity or courage to bring this
issue before this Court.
The FTC typically begins a Section 13(b)
monetary remedy action by filing it under seal,
obtaining a secret asset freeze in a temporary
restraining order. The FTC then allows unsealing of
the complaint to begin preliminary injunction
proceedings. By this point, all affected persons –
usually including corporate leadership who are
personally named and whose personal assets are
frozen – must plead for permission from the court to
partially unfreeze assets, simply to have living
expenses and to retain and keep counsel.16 The FTC’s
high settlement rate depends on placing defendants
in this coerced state. As one commentator explained:

Richard Newman, FTC Enforcement Actions, Asset
Freezes and Personal Liability, Performance Mktg.
Insider (Apr. 27, 2014),
http://performinsider.com/2014/04/ftc-enforcementactions-asset-freezes-and-personal-liability/ (last
visited May 16, 2014).
16
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Settled or stipulated verdicts are very common
and the rate of injunctive relief appears high.
From anecdotal notes in FTC reports it
appears that defendants to FTC settlements
and awards are often financially unable to
fund the monetary award and must seek
reductions from the FTC or bankruptcy
protection. Personal liability for the principals
is frequently in dispute. The mass action
aspects of FTC litigation discourage rescission
or counter-restitution in kind. It would be
reasonable to surmise that a defendant might
readily settle for an injunction and a moderate
monetary award rather than face the prospect
of defending a claim for a large claim for gross
disgorgement in a district court that has
previously agreed to follow the FTC’s
aggressive theory of monetary damages in
equity.
Roach, supra n.2, at 1315.
In short, litigants face immense pressure not
to bring the FTC’s overreach before this Court.
Litigants perceive the profound reluctance of the
remaining circuit courts – those that might later
hear the issue as one of first impression – to create a
circuit conflict (as happened here). On top of that,
litigants most often proceed under extreme duress
just to have defenses heard that they believe to be
meritorious. This Court should sieze this rare
opportunity for review, as it may not come again for
many decades, during which time the FTC will
continue to conduct its nonstatutory activities and
expand them into unexpected business areas.
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C.
The
District
of
Columbia
Circuit
Conflicts with the Fourth Circuit Approach, In
that It Excludes Monetary Relief from
Injunctive-Only
Statutes
Where
the
Comprehensive Statutory Framework Includes
Other Statutes that Permit It
Finally, while no direct circuit conflict exists
on the issue presented, the Fourth Circuit’s decision
conflicts with the District of Columbia Circuit on the
proper application of Porter and its progeny. Since
the conflict is more generalized than a single-issue
split, it potentially reaches many different statutory
regimes, not just the FTC Act. Viewed this way, the
situation at hand is jurisprudentially worse than the
single-issue circuit conflicts that often motivate this
Court’s review.
The Fourth Circuit’s decision here cited
United States v. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d 1190 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 960 (2005), as contrary
authority to its holding. (App. at 6a). Namely, the
District of Columbia Circuit in Philip Morris held
that an injunction section of the RICO Act did not
permit a disgorgement remedy since RICO provided
elaborate enforcement provisions elsewhere for such
relief. Id. at 1198. The District of Columbia Circuit’s
understanding and application of Porter and Mitchell
is hopelessly conflicted with the same understanding
and application by the Fourth Circuit below. As just
one example, the Philip Morris decision gives full
weight (correctly) to this Court’s identification of
“other order” language as critical to the ratio decendi
in Porter. Id. Yet the Fourth Circuit held the
opposite, finding (contrary to the District of
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Columbia Circuit’s analysis) that Mitchell greatly
broadened Porter’s holding and negated the
significance of the “other order” language.
In its 2005 petition for a writ of certiorari in
Philip Morris (Case No. 05-92) (Government’s PM
Petition), the Government agreed that a circuit
conflict exists that transcends subject area. There,
the Government urged review because Philip Morris
was “inconsistent with numerous decisions of other
courts of appeals applying the principles of Porter
and Mitchell to other statutory schemes.”
Government’s PM Petition at 19 n.6. Not
surprisingly, the Government included a citation
applying Section 13(b) of the FTC Act. Id. (citing
FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 469 (11th
Cir. 1996)).17
Only confusion can result from these opposing
approaches. The conflict renders unstable the extent
of nontextual, ancillary equitable remedies within
federal injunction statutes. This case presents the
opportunity to clarify the law and eliminate the
confusion.

The Governement also named opinions
interpreting Section 332(a) of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 332(a)); the
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78u(d)-(e); the
Motor Carrier Act of 1980; and the Commodity
Exchange Act. Government’s PM Petition at 19 n.6.
17
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IV.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a
writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Robert P. Greenspoon
Counsel of Record
William W. Flachsbart
Flachsbart & Greenspoon, LLC
333 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 2700
Chicago, Illinois 60601
312.551-9500
rpg@fg-law.com
Attorneys for Petitioner
Kristy Ross
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OPINIONAOF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH
CIRCUIT, DECIDED FEBRUARY 25, 2014
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-2340
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
KRISTY ROSS, individually and as officer of
Innovative Marketing, Inc.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
INNOVATIVE MARKETING, INC., d/b/a
Winsolutions FZ-LLC, d/b/a Billingnow, d/b/a
Winpayment Consultancy SPC, d/b/a BillPlanet PTE
Ltd., d/b/a Revenue Response Sunwell, d/b/a Globedat,
d/b/a Winsecure Solutions, d/b/a Synergy Software BV,
d/b/a Innovative Marketing Ukraine; BYTEHOSTING
INTERNET SERVICES, LLC; JAMES RENO,
d/b/a Setupahost.net, individually, and as an officer
of ByteHosting Internet Services, LLC; SAM JAIN,
individually and as an officer of Innovative Marketing,
Inc.; DANIEL SUNDIN, d/b/a Vantage Software,
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d/b/a Winsoftware, Ltd., individually and as an officer
of Innovative Marketing, Inc.; MARC D’SOUZA, d/b/a
Web Integrated Net Solutions, individually and as an
officer of Innovative Marketing, Inc.;
MAURICE D’SOUZA,
Defendants.
JUDGES: Before DAVIS and FLOYD, Circuit Judges,
and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Judge Davis
wrote the opinion, in which Judge Floyd and Senior Judge
Hamilton joined.
OPINION BY: DAVIS
OPINION
DAVIS, Circuit Judge:
The Federal Trade Commission sued Kristy Ross
in U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland for
engaging in deceptive internet advertising practices.
After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment
enjoining Ross from participating in the deceptive
practices and holding her jointly and severally liable for
equitable monetary consumer redress in the amount of
$163,167,539.95. F.T.C. v. Ross, 897 F. Supp. 2d 369, 38889 (D. Md. 2012). On appeal, Ross challenges the district
court’s judgment on several bases: (1) the court’s authority
to award consumer redress; (2) the legal standard the
court applied in fi nding individual liability under the
Federal Trade Commission Act; (3) the court’s prejudicial
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evidentiary rulings; and finally, (4) the soundness of the
district court’s factual findings. For the reasons set forth
within, we affi rm.
I
The Commission sued Innovative Marketing, Inc.
(“IMI”), and several of its high-level executives and
founders, including Ross, for running a deceptive internet
“scareware” scheme in violation of the prohibition on
deceptive advertising in Section 5(a) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). The core of the
Commission’s case was that the defendants operated “a
massive, Internet-based scheme that trick[ed] consumers
into purchasing computer security software,” referred
to as “scareware.” J.A. 29. The advertisements would
advise consumers that a scan of their computers had
been performed that had detected a variety of dangerous
fi les, like viruses, spyware, and “illegal” pornography; in
reality, no scans were ever conducted. J.A. 29.
Ross, a Vice President at IMI, hired counsel and
defended against the suit; the remaining defendants either
settled or had default judgment entered against them.
The district court entered summary judgment in favor
of the Commission on the issue of whether the advertising
was deceptive, but it set for trial the issue of whether Ross
could be held individually liable under the Federal Trade
Commission Act, i.e., whether Ross “was a ‘control person’
at the company, and to what extent she had authority for,
and knowledge of the deceptive acts committed by the
company.” J.A. 925.
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After a bench trial, the district court found in favor of
the Commission. Specifically, it found that Ross’
broad responsibilities at IMI coupled
with the fact that she personally
financed corporate expenses, oversaw
a large amount of employees and had a
hand in the creation and dissemination
of the deceptive ads prove[d] by a
preponderance of the evidence that
she had authority to control and
directly participated in the deceptive
acts within the meaning of Section 5 of
the [Federal Trade Commission] Act.
Ross, 897 F. Supp. 2d at 384. The district court further
concluded that Ross had actual knowledge of the deceptive
marketing scheme, or was “at the very least recklessly
indifferent or intentionally avoided the truth” about the
scheme. Id. at 386. It entered judgment against Ross in
the amount of $163,167,539.95, and it enjoined her from
engaging in similar deceptive marketing practices. Id. at
389. Ross timely appealed.
II
The Federal Trade Commission Act authorizes the
Commission to sue in federal district court so that “in
proper cases the Commission may seek, and after proper
proof, the court may issue, a permanent injunction.” 15
U.S.C. § 53(b). Ross contends that the district court did not
have the authority to award consumer redress - a money
judgment - under this provision of the statute.
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Ross first takes the position, correctly, that the
statute’s text does not expressly authorize the award of
consumer redress, but precedent dictates otherwise: the
Supreme Court has long held that Congress’ invocation
of the federal district court’s equitable jurisdiction brings
with it the full “power to decide all relevant matters in
dispute and to award complete relief even though the
decree includes that which might be conferred by a court
of law.” Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 399,
66 S. Ct. 1086, 90 L. Ed. 1332 (1946). Once invoked by
Congress in one of its duly enacted statutes, the district
court’s inherent equitable powers cannot be “denied or
limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative
command.” Id. Porter and its progeny thus articulate an
interpretive principle that inserts a presumption into what
would otherwise be the standard exercise of statutory
construction: we presume that Congress, in statutorily
authorizing the exercise of the district court’s injunctive
power, “acted cognizant of the historic power of equity
to provide complete relief in light of statutory purposes.”
Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288,
291-92, 80 S. Ct. 332, 4 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1960).
Applying this principle to the present case illuminates
the legislative branch’s real intent. That is, by authorizing
the district court to issue a permanent injunction in the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b)(2),
Congress presumably authorized the district court to
exercise the full measure of its equitable jurisdiction.
Accordingly, absent some countervailing indication
sufficient to rebut the presumption, the court had sufficient
statutory power to award “complete relief,” including
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monetary consumer redress, which is a form of equitable
relief. Porter, 328 U.S. at 399.
Ross insists that the text of the Federal Trade
Commission Act is unlike that of the statutes at issue
in Porter and Mitchell, and therefore argues that the
interpretive principle of those cases is inapplicable in
her case. In Porter, a case involving the Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942, the statute authorized district
courts to grant “a permanent or temporary injunction,
restraining order, or other order.” 328 U.S. at 397 (internal
quotations and citation omitted). Ross contends that the
“other order” language, absent from the instant provision
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, cabins Porter’s
applicability. See also United States v. Phillip Morris
USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1198, 364 U.S. App. D.C. 454
(D.C. Cir. 2005). In other words, her argument is that
Porter was a “magic words” case - if Congress uses the
magic words “other order,” then Congress has invoked
the full injunctive powers of the district court.
Ross’ magic words argument fails because it ignores
how the Supreme Court subsequently untethered
its reasoning from the “other order” language of the
Emergency Price Control Act and significantly expanded
Porter’s holding. The language of the statute at issue in
Mitchell, the Fair Labor Standards Act, was different
from the language of the statute in Porter, providing
only that the district court had jurisdiction to “restrain
violations of Section 15.” Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 289 (internal
quotation and citation omitted). Notwithstanding the
silence of the Fair Labor Standards Act as to the district
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court’s express power to award reimbursement of lost
wages and the absence of the “other order” language, the
Court held that ordering reimbursement was nevertheless
permissible under the holding of Porter. 361 U.S. at 296. In
comparing the language of the Fair Labor Standards Act
with the Emergency Price Control Act, the Mitchell Court
reasoned that the “other order” provision was merely an
“affi rmative confi rmation” – icing on the cake – over and
above the district court’s inherent equitable powers. See
id. at 291.
The point is that Mitchell broadened Por ter’s
applicability, rendering the textual statutory differences
irrelevant to the ultimate conclusion: because there is
no affi rmative and clear legislative restriction on the
equitable powers of the district court, ordering monetary
consumer redress is an appropriate “equitable adjunct”
to the district court’s injunctive power. Porter, 328 U.S.
at 399.
Ross makes a series of arguments about how the
structure, history, and purpose of the Federal Trade
Commission Act weigh against the conclusion that district
courts have the authority to award consumer redress; her
arguments are not entirely unpersuasive, but they have
ultimately been rejected by every other federal appellate
court that has considered this issue. F.T.C. v. Bronson
Partners LLC, 654 F.3d 359, 365-67 (2d Cir. 2011); F.T.C.
v. Amy Travel Service, Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 571 (7th Cir.
1989); F.T.C. v. Security Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931
F.2d 1312, 1314-15 (8th Cir. 1991); F.T.C. v. Pantron I
Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 1994); F.T.C. v. Gem
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Merchandising Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 468-70 (11th Cir. 1996).
We adopt the reasoning of those courts and reject Ross’
attempt to obliterate a significant part of the Commission’s
remedial arsenal. A ruling in favor of Ross would forsake
almost thirty years of federal appellate decisions and
create a circuit split, a result that we will not countenance
in the face of powerful Supreme Court authority pointing
in the other direction.
III
The Federal Trade Commission Act makes it
unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation
“to disseminate, or cause to be disseminated, any false
advertisement” in commerce, 15 U.S.C. § 52(a), and it
authorizes the Commission to bring suit in federal district
court when it finds that any such person, partnership, or
corporation “is engaged in, or is about to engage in, the
dissemination or the causing of the dissemination of any”
false advertisement, 15 U.S.C. § 53(a)(1).
The district court ruled that one could be held
individually liable under the Federal Trade Commission
Act if the Commission proves that the individual (1)
participated directly in the deceptive practices or had
authority to control them, and (2) had knowledge of the
deceptive conduct, which could be satisfied by showing
evidence of actual knowledge, reckless indifference to
the truth, or an awareness of a high probability of fraud
combined with intentionally avoiding the truth (i.e., willful
blindness). Ross, 897 F. Supp. 2d at 381.
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Ross contends that the district court’s standard was
wrong and asks us to reject it. She proposes that we import
a standard from our securities fraud jurisprudence that
requires proof of an individual’s (1) “authority to control
the specific practices alleged to be deceptive,” coupled
with a (2) “failure to act within such control authority
while aware of apparent fraud.” App. Br. 35 (citing
Dellastatious v. Williams, 242 F.3d 191, 194 (4th Cir.
2001)). Any other standard, argues Ross, would permit
a finding of individual liability based on “indicia having
more to do with enthusiasm for and skill at one’s job
[rather] than authority over specific ad campaigns, and
allow fault to be shown without any actual awareness of”
a co-worker’s misdeeds. App. Br. 36. Ross maintains that
she would not have been held individually liable under her
proposed standard.
Ross’ proposed standard would permit the Commission
to pursue individuals only when they had actual awareness
of specific deceptive practices and failed to act to stop
the deception, i.e., a specific intent/subjective knowledge
requirement; her proposal would effectively leave the
Commission with the “futile gesture” of obtaining “an
order directed to the lifeless entity of a corporation while
exempting from its operation the living individuals who
were responsible for the illegal practices” in the first place.
Pati-Port, Inc. v. F.T.C., 313 F.2d 103, 105 (4th Cir. 1963).
We hold that one may be found individually liable
under the Federal Trade Commission Act if she (1)
participated directly in the deceptive practices or had
authority to control those practices, and (2) had or should
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have had knowledge of the deceptive practices. The second
prong of the analysis may be established by showing that
the individual had actual knowledge of the deceptive
conduct, was recklessly indifferent to its deceptiveness,
or had an awareness of a high probability of deceptiveness
and intentionally avoided learning the truth.
Our ruling maintains uniformity across the country and
avoids a split in the federal appellate courts. Every other
federal appellate court to resolve the issue has adopted
the test we embrace today. F.T.C. v. Direct Marketing
Concepts, Inc., 624 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2010); Amy Travel
Service, 875 F.2d at 573-74; F.T.C. v. Publishing Clearing
House, Inc., 104 F.3d 1168, 1170 (9th Cir. 1997); F.T.C. v.
Freecom Communications, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1207 (10th
Cir. 2005); Gem Merchandising Corp., 87 F.3d at 470.
Ross’ proposed standard, by contrast, invites us to ignore
the law of every other sister court that has considered the
issue, an invitation that we decline.
IV
Ross next mounts three evidentiary challenges. First,
Ross contends that the district court improperly precluded
her expert, Scott Ellis, from testifying about how “the
advertisements linkable to Ms. Ross’s responsibilities
were nondeceptive.” App. Br. 29. As the district court
correctly ruled, however, Ellis’ testimony was irrelevant
because it had already decided the deceptiveness issue in
favor of the Commission at summary judgment. The only
issue held over for trial was whether Ross had the requisite
degree of control necessary to hold her individually liable
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for the company’s deceptive practices, i.e., whether she
participated directly in the company’s deceptive practices
or had authority to control those practices and had or
should have had knowledge of those practices. Because
the individual liability standard does not require a specific
link from Ross to particular deceptive advertisements
and instead looks at whether she had authority to control
the corporate entity’s practices, Ellis’ testimony was
immaterial, and thus irrelevant, to the issue reserved for
trial. Fed. R. Evid. 401.
Second, Ross challenges the admission of a 2004 to
2006 profit and loss statement that the district court relied
on to calculate the amount of consumer redress. The
documents were produced during discovery in corporate
litigation involving some of Ross’ co-defendants in Canada.
Daniel Sundin and Sam Jain sued Marc D’Souza, all
of whom were co-defendants of Ross in this case and
executives at IMI. Jain submitted an affidavit along with
a profit and loss summary for the company for the period
of 2004 to 2006; the documents were “litigation-purpose
financial summaries [of IMI’s profits] described in [Jain’s]
affidavit as a Quickbooks printout.” App. Br. 31, J.A. 1790,
1799.
Although the district court admitted the profit and
loss statement under Federal Rule of Evidence 807, the
residual exception to the rule against hearsay, F.T.C. v.
Ross, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129353, 2012 WL 4018037,
at *1-3 (D. Md. Sept. 11, 2012), we may affi rm the district
court “on the basis of any ground supported by the record
even if it is not the basis relied upon by the district court,”
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Ostrzenski v. Seigel, 177 F.3d 245, 253 (4th Cir. 1999), and
we conclude that the profit and loss summary plainly was
admissible as an adoptive admission by Ross. Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(2)(B). Ross expressly adopted Jain’s affidavit: she
swore in her own affidavit produced during the Canadian
litigation that she had read Jain’s affidavit and was “in
agreement with [its] contents.” J.A. 1590. She did take
some exceptions, but she did not object to the profit and
loss statement attached to Jain’s affidavit, nor did she
object to the authenticity or reliability of the statements.
The third of Ross’ evidentiary assignments of error
also rests on the improper admission of hearsay evidence:
an e-mail from Sundin to Jettis, a payment processor,
listing Skype numbers and titles for a group of highlevel company executives. Ross’ telephone number is
listed on the e-mail, as is her title, “Vice President.” The
district court admitted the e-mail pursuant to the hearsay
exception for statements made by a co-conspirator in
furtherance of the conspiracy. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)
(E). Ross argues that there was insufficient evidence
establishing as a predicate for the e-mail’s admission
the existence of the conspiracy, and that admission of
the e-mail itself was improper “bootstrapping” of the
existence of the conspiracy to the document’s admissibility.
See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176-81, 107
S. Ct. 2775, 97 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1987).
We disagree. It is true, of course, that the proponent
for admission of a co-conspirator’s out-of-court statement
“must demonstrate the existence of the conspiracy by
evidence extrinsic to the hearsay statements.” United
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States v. Stroupe, 538 F.2d 1063, 1065 (4th Cir. 1976).
But that requirement was satisfied in this case. There
was independent evidence that established the existence
of the conspiracy: Ross produced an affidavit during the
corporate litigation in Canada in which she stated that she
was a Vice President and one of the founders of IMI, and
she adopted the affidavits of her co-defendants attesting
to the same facts. The affidavits provided a sufficient
basis upon which the district court could conclude, prima
facie, see United States v. Vaught, 485 F.2d 320, 323 (4th
Cir. 1973), the existence of a conspiracy. Moreover, the
e-mail from Sundin to Jettis was a quintessential example
of a statement made “in furtherance” of the conspiracy
because its role was to maintain the logistics of the
conspiracy and “identify names and roles” of members of
the deceptive advertising endeavor. Michael H. Graham,
Handbook of Federal Evidence 421 (7th ed. 2013).
In sum, we fi nd no reversible error in the district
court’s evidentiary rulings that are challenged on appeal
by Ross.
V
Ross’ last contention is that the district court clearly
erred in finding that she had “control” of the company,
participated in any deceptive acts, and had knowledge
of the deceptive advertisements. In a bench trial, we
review the district court’s factual findings for clear
error and its legal conclusions de novo. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52;
Helton v. AT&T, Inc., 709 F.3d 343, 351 (4th Cir. 2013).
“In cases in which a district court’s factual findings turn
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on assessments of witness credibility or the weighing of
confl icting evidence during a bench trial, such findings
are entitled to even greater deference.” Helton, 709 F.3d
at 351.
The district court did not clearly err in finding
that Ross had “authority to control the deceptive acts
within the meaning” of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. Ross, 897 F. Supp. 2d at 383. In an affidavit in the
Canadian litigation, she swore that she was a high-level
business official with duties involving, among other things,
“product optimization,” which the district court could
reasonably have inferred afforded her authority and
control over the nature and quality of the advertisements.
J.A. 1589. Moreover, there was evidence that other
employees requested Ross’ authority to approve certain
advertisements, and that she would check the design of
the advertisements before approving them.
Nor did the district court clearly err in finding that
Ross “directly participated in the deceptive marketing
scheme.” Ross, 897 F. Supp. 2d at 384. Ross’ statements
to other employees, as memorialized in chat logs between
her and other employees were evidence that she served
in a managerial role, directing the design of particular
advertisements. J.A. 3580 (“anyway we have to get all this
advertisement stuff off these ads can you please [make]
sure it happens it needs to happen for all domains”); J.A.
1491 (“btw we have some 30 creatives for errclean [sic]
not just 2-3 just add aggression tot hem [sic]”). Ross was
a contact person for the purchase of advertising space for
IMI, and there was evidence that Ross had the authority
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to discipline staff and developers when the work did not
meet her standards. J.A. 1466 (“please ensure its [sic]
going to be done or im [sic] going to fine the department
and MCs for not fi nishing it”). Given these facts, the
district court could have reasonably inferred that Ross
was actively and directly participating in multiple stages
of the deceptive advertising scheme - she played a role
in design, directed others to “add aggression” to certain
advertisements, was in a position of authority, had the
power to discipline entire departments, and purchased
substantial advertising space.
The district court did not clearly err in finding
that Ross “had actual knowledge of the deceptive
marketing scheme” and/or that she was “at the very
least recklessly indifferent or intentionally avoided the
truth.” Ross, 897 F. Supp. 2d at 386. There was evidence
that she edited and reviewed the content of multiple
advertisements. At one point, she ordered the removal
of the word “advertisement” from a set of ads. J.A. 3580.
Co-defendant Sundin, the Chief Technology Officer of
IMI and its sole shareholder and director, attested that
Ross assumed some of his duties during his long-term
illness. And although there was some indication that
Ross acted in a manner suggesting that she personally
did not perceive (or believe) that the advertisements were
deceptive, Ross was on notice of multiple complaints about
IMI’s advertisements, including that they would cause
consumers to automatically download unwanted IMI
products.
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All of this evidence paints a picture that the district
court was wholly capable of accepting as a matter of fact:
Ross made “countless decisions” that demonstrated her
authority to control IMI. F.T.C. v. Bay Area Business
Council, Inc., 423 F.3d 627, 637 (7th Cir. 2005). Although
a different fact-finder may have come to a contrary
conclusion from that reached by the experienced district
judge in this case, the “rigorous” clear error standard
requires more than a party’s simple disagreement with
the court’s findings. PCS Nitrogen, Inc. v. Ashley II of
Charleston, LLC, 714 F.3d 161, 174-75 (4th Cir. 2013).
VI
The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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APPENDIX B — MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND
ORDER & JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
MARYLAND, DATED SEPTEMBER 24, 2012
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CIVIL ACTION NO.: RDB-08-3233
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
v.
KRISTY ROSS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS AN
OFFICER OF INNOVATIVE MARKETING, INC.,
Defendant.
September 24, 2012, Decided
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) brought this
case under Sections 5(a) and 13(b) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (“FTC Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a) and 53(b),
against a group of corporate entities and individuals for
alleged deceptive conduct in connection with the sale of
software. Specifically, the FTC alleged that two companies,
Defendants Innovative Marketing, Inc. (“IMI”) and
ByteHosting Internet Services, LLC (“ByteHosting”),
operated as a common enterprise (the “IMI Enterprise” or
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“Enterprise”) to conduct a massive “scareware”1 scheme
that marketed a variety of computer security software
via deceptive advertising. The FTC alleged that several
of the companies’ officers and directors, namely, Sam
Jain (“Jain”), Daniel Sundin (“Sundin”), Marc D’Souza
(“D’Souza”), Kristy Ross (“Ross”), and James Reno
(“Reno”), directed or participated in the IMI Enterprise.
The FTC also named Maurice D’Souza, the father of Marc
D’Souza, as a defendant in this suit. Of the original eight
defendants, four have settled with the FTC, and three are
in default and have had judgments entered against them
for failure to appear and participate in this litigation.
Defendant Kristy Ross is the only remaining defendant
at issue. 2
Jurisdiction over this case is based on the United
States’ status as a plaintiff under 28 U.S.C. § 1345 and
federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. After
a two-day bench trial from September 11 to September
12, 2012, this Court has carefully considered the exhibits
introduced into evidence, the testimony of the witness
who testified in person, the testimony of the witnesses
presented by deposition, the Proposed Final Pretrial
1. As noted in the FTC’s Complaint, “scareware” is a common
term that refers to a software-driven, Internet-based scheme
that “exploits consumers’ legitimate concerns about Internetbased threats like spyware and viruses by issuing false security
or privacy warnings to consumers for the sole purpose of selling
software to fi x the imagined problem.” Compl. ¶ 15, ECF No. 1.
2. While she has been served and has retained counsel, she
has failed to answer and respond to any discovery requests and
to appear for trial.
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Order, the written submissions of the parties, and the
oral arguments of counsel. The following constitutes this
Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant
to Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The accompanying Order enters Judgment in favor of
Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission against Defendant
Kristy Ross individually, and as an officer of Innovative
Marketing, Inc.
I.

BACKGROUND

The FTC filed the present action on December 2, 2008
against Defendants Innovative Marketing, Inc. (“IMI”),
ByteHosting Internet Services, LLC (“ByteHosting”),
Sam Jain (“Jain”), Daniel Sundin (“Sundin”), Marc
D’Souza (“D’Souza”), Kristy Ross (“Ross”), and James
Reno (“Reno”), and later added Maurice D’Souza as
a defendant. After a hearing was held on December
12, 2008, this Court entered a Preliminary Injunction
that served to, inter alia, prohibit Defendants from
continuing the alleged deceptive business activities, freeze
Defendants’ assets, and compel Defendants to turn over
certain business records to the FTC. In February 2010,
Defendants ByteHosting Internet Services, LLC, James
Reno, Marc D’Souza and Maurice D’Souza settled with the
FTC. That same month, default judgments were entered
against corporate Defendant Innovative Marketing, Inc.,
and Defendants Sam Jain and Daniel Sundin for failure
to appear and participate in this litigation. 3
3. A criminal action was brought against Defendants Sundin,
Jain and Reno in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois in connection with their activities with IMI. See USA
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Ultimately, the FTC fi led a Motion for Summary
Judgment against Defendant Ross. The sole count of
the Complaint against her alleges that in the course
of marketing, offering for sale, and selling computer
software, she and her co-defendants misrepresented,
expressly or by implication, that they had conducted
scans of consumers’ computers and detected security
or privacy issues, including viruses, spyware, system
errors and pornography. The Complaint also alleges that
since 2004 or earlier, Defendants had placed misleading
advertisements for their software products with major
Internet advertising networks, which serve as brokers
that distribute advertisements to their website partners.
The advertising networks contracted with their partners
to display the Defendants’ advertisements across the
Internet. A fter the advertising networks, such as
MyGeek, began to receive complaints, they stopped
v. Bjorn Daniel Sundin, Shaileshkumar P. Jain, a.k.a Sam
Jain, and James Reno, Criminal Action No. 1:10-cr-00452. This
case was assigned to the Fugitive Calendar on June 7, 2012 with
respect to Defendants Sundin and Jain. Additionally, two other
actions are presently pending against Defendant Jain. First, he
is charged with Failure to Appear After Pre-Trial Release in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in a case
where he was charged with Criminal Copyright Infringement,
Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods, as well as Mail and Wire Fraud.
See USA v. Shaleshkumar Jain, a/k/a/ Sam Jain, Criminal Action
No. EXE-09-00137. Second, he was indicted on May 20, 2010 in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for
International and Domestic Money Laundering with respect to a
number of internet-based companies, including IMI, owned and
operated by him. See USA v. Shaileshkumar Jain, a/k/a Sam Jain,
Criminal Action No. NRB-10-00442.
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accepting Defendants’ advertisements. At that point,
in 2007, Defendants began creating a number of sham
Internet advertising agencies that duped advertising
networks and commercial websites into accepting their
misleading advertisements. Toward this end, Defendants
falsely represented that they were authorized to place
advertisements, and they used sophisticated program
coding that concealed the exploitative nature of the
ads in order to gain approval for distribution from the
advertising networks. Once distributed and placed on
popular Internet sites, the exploitative content of the
ads was revealed to many of the consumers, who were
thereupon redirected to the Defendants’ websites that
operated the bogus scans.
In her opposition to the FTC’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, Defendant Ross argued that she was merely an
employee and not a “control person” at the company, she
did not have the requisite knowledge of the misconduct
at issue, and as a result she bore no individually liability
under the Act. On June 11, 2012, this Court denied the
FTC’s Motion for Summary Judgment and noted that
despite the FTC’s substantial evidence, it was unable,
at this stage of the litigation, to conclusively determine
“whether the FTC was entitled to summary judgment
against Kristy Ross because to do so would require [it]
to make credibility findings, inferences, and findings of
fact that are more properly made in the context of a bench
trial.” (Mem. Op. at 8, ECF No. 227). However, the Court
held that there was no genuine issue of material fact that
Ms. Ross’s co-defendants violated Section 5 of the FTC
Act by making misrepresentations to consumers through
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Internet-based ads and software-generated reports that
induced consumers to purchase their computer security
products. (Mem. Op. & Order, ECF Nos. 227 & 228; Ltr.
Order, ECF No. 229).
Accordingly, a bench trial was scheduled. Prior to
trial, this Court found that the total amount of consumer
injury calculated by the FTC --$163,167,539.95-- was a
proper measure for consumer redress in this case. (ECF
No. 246). 4 Additionally, this Court issued a ruling in
which it granted Defendant Ross’s Motion in Limine to
Preclude Application of an Adverse Inference because of
her assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege. (ECF
No. 254). Pursuant to the same order, this Court denied
Defendant Ross’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Hearsay
(ECF No. 241). In this motion, Defendant Ross sought to
exclude the out-of-court statements and documents made
in connection with the lawsuit in Canada (“Canadian
Litigation”) in which Ms. Ross’s co-defendants sued each
other over the profits of IMI, the business at the center
of the present case. This Court held these statements and
documents admissible under Rule 807 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Specifically, this Court determined that the
statements were made by Innovative Marketing’s highranking executives, and although they were not subject
to cross-examination, they were made in anticipation
4. This Order also denied Defendant Ross’s Motion in
Limine in support of calling Scott Ellis as an expert witness
(ECF No. 236). Having already determined that IMI was engaged
in deceptive marketing, this Court found Mr. Ellis’s opinion
that advertisements placed by Ms. Ross were neither false nor
deceptive to be irrelevant. (Mem. Order at 4, ECF No. 246).
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that they would be evaluated and challenged in a court of
law. Moreover, the Court concluded that the challenged
evidence was offered as evidence of a material fact and was
more probative than other evidence that could reasonably
be obtained as it related to the scope and nature of the
alleged conspiracy, and served to illustrate a major
element of the trial in this case--namely, the role Ms. Ross
played while working at Innovative Marketing. (Mem.
Op. at 5, ECF No. 254). As a result, the precise issues
remaining in this case concerned the extent of Defendant
Ross’s control over or participation in IMI’s deceptive
marketing practices, and her knowledge of these practices.
On September 11 and 12, 2012, a bench trial was held,
and Defendant Ross was tried in absentia. Consistent with
its prior rulings, this Court has not applied an adverse
inference against Defendant Ross for electing not to
appear at trial and for asserting her Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. During trial, the FTC
called one witness: Bhaskar Ballapragada, president of
AdOn Network, an advertising network formally known
as MyGeek. The Defendant did not call any witnesses,
but each party entered large volumes of documents into
evidence.
This Court, having considered the evidence presented
at trial and having reviewed the parties’ pre-trial
submissions, finds that Defendant Kristy Ross had
authority to control the deceptive practices or acts of
Innovating Marketing and that she participated directly in
these deceptive practices. Additionally, the FTC has shown
by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Ross

24a
Appendix B
had knowledge of the deceptive practices of Innovative
Marketing, Inc. (“IMI”) or that alternatively she clearly
acted with reckless indifference and intentionally avoided
the truth. As a result, Kristy Ross is individually liable for
IMI’s unlawful practices and judgment shall be entered
in favor of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)
against her. The FTC shall be awarded injunctive relief
and monetary relief in the form of consumer redress
and disgorgement. Specifically, Defendant Ross shall be
permanently restrained and enjoined from the marketing
and sale of computer security software and software that
interferes with consumers’ computer use as well as from
engaging in any form of deceptive marketing. Defendant
Ross shall also be jointly and severally liable with the
co-Defendants Innovative Marketing, Inc., Sam Jain
and Daniel Sundin for the consumer redress amount of
$163,167,539.95.
II. FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Formation of Innovative Marketing, Inc.
(“IMI”) & the Canadian Litigation

In November 20 01, Defendant Daniel Sundin
(“Sundin”) started a business which he incorporated,
in July 2002, as Innovative Marketing, Inc. (“IMI”) 5
pursuant to the laws of Belize and with its headquarters
in Ukraine. The aim of the business was to develop and
market online consumer products on an international
5. It is important to note that the Defendants also used the
name Globedat to refer to IMI.
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platform. In early 2002, Defendants Sam Jain (“Jain”)
and Kristy Ross (“Ross”) were exploring new e-commerce
opportunities for investment and collaboration. At the
time, Ms. Ross was romantically involved with Mr. Jain
and had previously held positions in companies held by
him. In April 2002, Ms. Ross introduced Mr. Sundin,
whom she had known since September 2000 through other
business acquaintances, to Mr. Jain. Ms. Ross and Mr.
Jain were interested in joining forces with Mr. Sundin as
they perceived IMI to have “tremendous growth potential
. . . [but] felt it lacked the marketing expertise that [Ross
and Jain] would be able to bring to the venture.” Jain Aff.,
Pl.’s Ex. 27 at 328, ¶ 3. After several meetings, Mr. Jain
and Mr. Sundin both agreed to participate in this new
business venture and to take lead roles in it. While the
partnership agreement was never reduced to a writing,
it was understood that Defendants Jain, Sundin and Ross
would share in the profits of the business. Both Jain and
Sundin recognized that Ms. Ross had valuable marketing
expertise and while her percentage of the profits was to be
smaller than theirs, there was no disagreement that she
would be entitled to certain percentages of IMI’s profits.
Sundin Aff., Pl.’s Ex. 21 at 453-54, ¶ 7; Jain Aff., Pl.’s Ex.
27 at 330, ¶ 14 & at 402, 471-72; Marc D’Souza Aff., Pl.’s
Ex. 24 at 146.
Upon joining IMI, Mr. Jain brought a number of
employees with him. Defendant Marc D’Souza (“D’Souza”)
was one of these employees. Mr. D’Souza worked as a sales
and marketing consultant to secure lucrative advertising
and media buying deals and had been trained by Ms. Ross
and Mr. Jain. At the time that IMI was being formed, Mr.
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D’Souza was renegotiating his contract with Mr. Jain. The
finalized negotiations were then proposed to Mr. Sundin
who did not object. According to these terms, Mr. D’Souza
was to receive “1% of the company’s profits up to $200,000
a month and 20% of the company’s profits in excess of
$200,000 per month.” Sundin Aff., Pl.’s Ex. 21 at 454, ¶
8; Jain Aff., Pl.’s Ex. 27 at 330-32, ¶¶ 13-23. Again, this
agreement was not reduced to a writing, but a partnership
was formed between Defendants Jain, Sundin, D’Souza
and Ross whereby each individual would receive a share of
the profits of IMI. The shares were apparently not equal as
Jain and Sundin had made initial monetary contributions
to the business which Ross and D’Souza had not. As of
2002 and until 2008, IMI was formed and engaged in the
business of selling web-based software such as antivirus
software, anti-spyware software and registry cleaners
which were marketed through IMI-owned and maintained
websites. At trial the parties agreed that IMI was a
corporation which grew to employ over six hundred (600)
employees over several countries including, among others,
the United States, Argentina, India and Ukraine.
On December 29, 2006, Mr. D’Souza contacted
Ms. Ross, Mr. Jain and Mr. Sundin on behalf of Web
Integrated Net Solutions, Inc. to inform them of the
termination of their joint venture. Jain Aff., Pl.’s Ex. 27 at
475-78. In January of 2007, Mr. D’Souza again contacted
Defendants Jain, Sundin and Ross to inform them of
the termination of approximately forty (40) advertising
contracts. Id. at 479. Later that year, Defendants Jain,
Sundin and D’Souza were involved in a lawsuit in Canada
(the “Canadian Litigation”), in which Defendants Jain and
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Sundin sought to recover $48 million which Defendant
D’Souza had allegedly embezzled from IMI. While Ms.
Ross was neither named in that litigation nor included
in the Settlement Agreement, she was the only other
person, apart from Defendants Jain, Sundin and D’Souza,
to submit an affidavit in the case. Ross Aff., Pl.’s Ex. 20;
Settlement Agreement, Def.’s Ex. 2. Mr. D’Souza also
made an attempt to settle the case by giving Ms. Ross,
Mr. Jain and Mr. Sundin percentages of the business. In
response to that proposal, Mr. Jain stated that “it was
‘extortion for you [Marc] to hold hostage money belonging
to me, Daniel & Kristy so as to force us to make a deal
with you.” Jain Aff., Pl.’s Ex. 27 ¶ 43. During the bench
trial, Ms. Ross’s counsel sought to explain her involvement
in the Canadian Litigation by stating that at the time Ms.
Ross had been romantically involved with Mr. D’Souza
since 2006, and he had confided in her that he intended
to “run off with the money.” Bench Trial, Sept. 11, 2012,
ECF No. 255. Despite the best efforts of her counsel, Ms.
Ross has presented no evidence to that effect nor is her
lawyer’s argument evidence in this case.
2.

The IMI Deceptive Marketing Scheme

This Court has previously held that the conduct
in this case violated Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act as a result of representations being
made to consumers through Internet-based ads and
software-generated reports that induced consumers to
purchase their computer security products. (Mem. Op.
& Order, ECF Nos. 227 & 228; Ltr. Order, ECF No.
229). Specifically, the Defendants -both corporate and
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individual- developed a series of software advertisements,
in the form of popups and warnings, purporting to
discover malicious software (“malware”) on consumers’
computers and provide a “cure” at a cost ranging from $30
to $100, depending on the software involved. Essentially,
these deceptive advertisements, some of which included
sham “system scans,” had the effect of convincing internet
users that their computers contained malicious software,
“illegal” pornography, or critical system errors, and
that to fi x these problems they needed the Defendants’
repair software. The repair software sold by IMI
included WinFixer, WinAntiVirus, WinAntiVvirusPro,
W i n A nt i S p y w a r e , Po p up g u a r d , W i n F i r e w a l l ,
InternetAntispy, WinPopupguard, ComputerShield,
WinAntispy, PCsupercharger, ErrorSafe, SysProtect,
DriveCleaner, SystemDoctor and ErrorProtector.
However, both the advertisements and the repair software
were deceptive. In fact, the number of errors found on any
given computer was pre-determined by the Defendants.
Moreover, the Defendants sold scareware as these repair
products did not in fact repair or clean consumers’
computers. As a result, more than one million consumers
purchased Defendants’ products, and approximately three
thousand customers fi led complaints with the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”).6 Consumer Compls., Pl.’s
Ex. 40. Moreover, every major computer security vendor
considered these products to be system threats.

6. In addition, the FTC submitted fi fty-three (53) sworn
customer declarations detailing consumer interactions with fortyseven (47) of Defendants’ products. Consumer Decls., Pl.’s Ex. 39.
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3.

Defendant Kristy Ross’s Role at IMI

Having already determined that a deceptive marketing
scheme existed, the remaining issue before this Court
and addressed at the bench trial was the extent to which
Defendant Ross was involved in this marketing scam and
could be held responsible. After conducting a significant
investigation into the IMI deceptive marketing scheme,
Federal Trade Commission investigator Sheryl Drexler,
now known as Sheryl Novick, specifically identified Ms.
Ross as one of the “individuals [ ] responsible for the
scheme.” Drexler Decl., Def.’s Ex. 1 at ¶ 3.
Defendant Ross worked at Innovative Marketing,
Inc. from 2002 to 2008. She was in charge of business
expansion, sales and marketing, as well as product
optimization. Although IMI did not use formal titles until
late 2005, from 2006 to 2008 she essentially performed the
same functions but held the position of Vice President of
Business Development. She also intermittently replaced
Defendant Sundin as Chief Operating Officer and Chief
Technology Officer from 2004 to 2007. She assumed these
roles because Mr. Sundin was suffering from bacterial
overgrowth syndrome and because he considered her
“to be a savvy manager and technically knowledgeable
in [his] areas of computer software and design as well as
marketing skills.” Sundin Aff., Pl.’s Ex. 21 ¶ 15. Moreover,
at times she had access to his email account and was
carbon copied on all emails sent to him. See, e.g., Chat
Log, Def.’s Ex. 9A; see also Email, Def.’s Ex. 3.
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As part of her duties, Ms. Ross often approved and
requested payment for expenses incurred by IMI, and on
several occasions, used her personal credit card to pay for
certain advertising and operating expenses. Specifically,
she was one of seven people to approve expenses at IMI.
Additionally, she was in charge of reorganizing IMI’s
operational structure and dealt with accounting, hiring
and IMI product issues. Notably, a chat log 7 reveals that
she and Defendants Jain and Sundin were to fi nalize
the “todos [sic]” for the company reorganization prior to
their distribution to the managers. Chat Log, Def.’s Ex.
3A at 365. In the same chat log, she instructs “James”8 to
provide her with a problem-solving matrix which would
contribute to the reorganization of certain departments.
Id. Another chat log indicates that on several occasions
she attended meetings with a major venture capital fi rm
interested in doing business with IMI. Chat Log, Def.’s
Ex. No. 11A at 3. Furthermore, the bulk of the IMI chat
logs reveal that Ms. Ross routinely made executive-type
decisions, demanding that employees fi x problems and
follow company procedures, and delegating IMI business
projects. See generally Chat Logs, Def.’s Exs. 1A - 16A.
Ms. Ross even threatened to fine an entire department
if it did not complete a project on schedule. Chat Log,
7. The parties have stipulated to the fact that Ms. Ross’s
username in the chat logs was “fuzzy.” Prop. Final Pretrial Order
at 15, ¶ 8, ECF No. 239.
8. The parties agree that “James” in the chat logs refers to
James Reno, one of the former Defendants in this case who settled
with the FTC. As noted, Reno was indicted in Criminal Action No.
1-10-cr-00452 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois. See supra n. 3.
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Def.’s Ex. 1A at 323; see also Chat Log, Def.’s Ex. 7A.
Additionally, she often demanded and obtained reports
on web traffic, sales numbers, and click-through response
rates for IMI’s products and advertising campaigns. She
also participated in strategic discussions regarding IMI’s
future, was actively involved in the daily operations of
the company and had the authority to set prices for IMI’s
products. See, e.g., Chat Log, Def.’s Ex. 14A.
With respect to the deceptive ads, Ms. Ross used
her expertise in marketing and personally approved,
developed, wrote, altered, reviewed, and contributed to a
large number of them. In fact, she dictated the appearance
and style of certain ads, suggested which words should or
should not be included and how certain sentences should
be translated, as well as decided the level of aggression to
consumers that these ads should present. See, e.g., Chat
Log, Pl.’s Ex. 1 at 326; Chat Log, Pl.’s Ex. 2 at 351; Chat
Log, Def.’s Ex. 1A at 322, 326, 331; Chat Log, Def.’s Ex
2A at 348, 351-52. On two occasions, Ms. Ross instructed
ad developers to remove advertising disclaimers which
would have indicated to consumers that these popups or
warnings were mere advertisements as opposed to real
scanners. See, e.g., Chat Log, Def.’s Ex. 2A at 352. In the
company’s chat logs, Ross is observed directing employees
to make ads more aggressive because “aggression zero
doesn’t [sic] give sales.” Chat Log, Def.’s Ex. 2A at 350. In
another instance, she specifically instructs the developers
to “add aggression” to certain creatives. Chat Log, Def.’s
Ex. 2A at 347.
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In October 2004, Ross opened fifty-four (54) individual
password-protected accounts with MyGeek, an internet
advertising company which would later become known
as AdOn. She used these accounts until 2007 to place
advertisements in the form of Flash ads 9 for IMI
products including Winfi xer, DriveCleaner, FreeRepair,
WinAntivirus, WinAntispyware, System Doctor and
others. These ads reached customers over 600 million
times. She personally funded the advertisements placed
at MyGeek for up to approximately $23,000 and then used
Marc D’Souza and Daniel Sundin’s credit cards as well
as wire transfers from IMI’s account to place additional
advertisements. Pl.’s Ex. 35; Drexler Decl., Def.’s Ex 1,
¶¶ 106, 111. “In total, Kristy Ross placed $3.3 million of
advertisements for Defendants’ products with MyGeek.”
Drexler Decl., Def.’s Ex. 1 ¶ 111. Ms. Ross also possessed
a password-protected account at ValueClick which allowed
her to use ValueClick’s adserver, Mediaplex, to store ads
which were disseminated though the MyGeek ad network.
As the direct contact at IMI for MyGeek, Ms. Ross
interacted daily with the MyGeek account manager, Geoff
Gieron. Specifically, Mr. Gieron would get in touch with her
when publishers and other ad networks complained about
the Defendants’ advertisements. In attempts to resolve the
problems, publishers would contact MyGeek, who would
in turn contact Ms. Ross, by forwarding screenshots of
9. “A Flash object is a binary fi le that can contain multiple
graphics and logic to animate those graphics. The fi le can then
be opened by a Flash player plug-in within a consumer’s browser
much like a word document can be opened in Microsoft Word.”
Prop. Final Pretrial Order at 28, ¶ 22.
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the problems and asking for an immediate fi x. Ms. Ross
was repeatedly informed that these ads violated company
policy as they included download software without content.
See, e.g., Drexler Decl., Def.’s Ex. 1 ¶¶ 115-117. Accordingly,
Ms. Ross routinely communicated with MyGeek regarding
complaints that the company received pertaining to IMI
ads, and approved and edited the contents of ads placed on
the MyGeek network, but the problems continued to occur.
Id. In one instance, MyGeek contacted Ms. Ross about a
specific DryCleaner advertisement containing a popup
window which read “DriveCleaner found 948 Dangerous
Files in your system. Get rid of them?” Gieron Dep., Pl.’s
Ex. 55 at 318. Upon reviewing this advertisement, Ms.
Ross responded “This is not a popup, it is flash in the
website . . . this is an example of the scanner . . . This is
certainly not a popup or Active x.” Id. at 36, lines 140:1
- 140:18.
Accordingly, Ms. Ross was aware that these
advertisements purported to do more than they actually
did. Additionally, other chat log conversations involving
Ms. Ross indicate that she was aware that the ads were
“unpleasant” and that she knew that IMI’s advertising
was causing problems, including low customer retention
and even lawsuits. See, e.g., Chat Log, Pl.’s Ex. 11 at 3.
On March 29, 2007, MyGeek terminated its relationship
with IMI by informing Ms. Ross that it “’will no longer
be running ads from any advertiser that sell products in
the area of spyware, antivirus, registry cleaner, system
doctor, evidence eraser and the like’ because their
relationships with ‘traffic partners have been threatened
and we just can’t afford the risk any longer.’” Drexler
Decl., Pl.’s Ex. 1 ¶ 118.
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III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The FTC has brought the present action under
sections 5(a) and 13 of the FTC Act. Section 5(a) of
the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1), prohibits engaging in
“[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce,
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce.” Section 13, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), authorizes the
FTC to seek injunctive relief for section 5 violations. To
succeed under section 5(a), the FTC must prove (1) that
there was a representation; (2) that the representation was
likely to mislead consumers; and (3) that the misleading
representation was material. See FTC v. Tashman, 318
F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2003).
Having established liability for Defendant IMI,
Defendant Ross may be held individually liable upon a
showing by the FTC that she “participated directly in
the practices or acts or had authority to control them.”
FTC v. Amy Travel Service, Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 573 (7th
Cir. 1989); see also, e.g., FTC v. Freecom Commc’n.,
Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2005); FTC v. Publ’g
Clearing House, Inc., 104 F.3d 1168, 1170 (9th Cir. 1997).
“Authority to control the company can be evidenced by
active involvement in business affairs and the making
of corporate policy, including assuming the duties of
a corporate officer.” Amy Travel, 875 F.2d at 573. In
addition, the FTC must show that Defendant Ross had
some knowledge of the violative conduct. See Publishing
Clearing House, 104 F.3d at 1170 (noting that corporate
individuals are liable if they “had knowledge that the
corporation or one of its agents engaged in dishonest or
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fraudulent conduct, that the misrepresentations were
the type which a reasonable and prudent person would
rely, and that consumer injury resulted”). In this regard
the FTC need not make a showing of “intent per se”
-- instead the knowledge requirement may be “fulfi lled
by showing that the individual had ‘actual knowledge
of material misrepresentations, reckless indifference
to the truth or falsity of such misrepresentations, or an
awareness of a high probability of fraud along with an
intentional avoidance of the truth.’” Amy Travel, 875
F.2d at 574 (quoting FTC v. Kitco of Nevada, Inc., 612
F. Supp. 1282, 1292 (D. Minn. 1985)); see also FTC v.
Direct Mktg. Concepts, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 2d 285, 311 (D.
Mass. 2008) (noting that the FTC must prove “that the
individual defendants either knew or should have known
about the deceptive practices, but it is not required to
prove subjective intent to defraud”).
It has been Defendant Ross’s position that she should
not be held individually liable because the FTC has not
satisfied its burden to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that she either had authority to control or directly
participated in the deceptive acts. Moreover, Defendant
contends that the FTC failed to demonstrate that she
knew of the IMI deceptive marketing scheme. At trial,
Defendant’s counsel made much of the fact that at the
time of the formation of IMI, Ms. Ross was a twenty-twoyear-old woman romantically involved with one of the main
partners of IMI. Her counsel further explained that she
was not a corporate officer but that she held a position
of favor due to her status as Mr. Jain’s girlfriend. She
contended that instead she held a type of administrative
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assistant’s role, facilitated employee relations because
she was kinder and easier to work with than Defendant
Jain, and stepped up when necessary to help out when
Mr. Sundin became too ill to fulfi ll his responsibilities.
Ms. Ross’s counsel repeatedly argued that she was a
troubleshooter and introduced the idea, for the fi rst time
at trial, that her position was not that of a Vice President
but more that of a media buyer which is considered to be
a lower level employee. During the brief bench trial, Ms.
Ross’s counsel sought to paint the picture of a betrayed
young woman who had made poor choices in both work
and life partners.10 Once again, the argument of counsel
is not evidence in this case in which Ms. Ross not only
failed to respond to any discovery request but declined
to appear for trial.11
1.

Ms. Ross’s Authority to Control or Her Direct
Participation in the Deceptive Acts

To secure individual liability under the FTC Act,
there must be a showing of participation or control in
an enterprise’s unlawful activity, which in turn may
be indicated by an individual’s assumption of duties as
a corporate officer, involvement in business affairs, or
10. Ms. Ross was romantically involved with both Defendants
Jain and D’Souza at different times during the deceptive
marketing scheme.
11. While this Court does not apply any adverse inference
against Ms. Ross for her assertion of her Fifth Amendment
privilege, her counsel cannot offer testimony on her behalf. The
creative argument of counsel is not evidence in a case.
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role in the development of corporate policies. See Publ’g
Clearing House, 104 F.3d at 1171; Amy Travel, 875 F.2d
at 573; FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1117 (S.D.
Cal. 2008); FTC v. Nat’l Urological Group, Inc., 645 F.
Supp. 2d 1167, 1207-08 (N.D. Ga. 2008); FTC v. Wilcox,
926 F. Supp. 1091, 1104 (S.D. Fla. 1995). On the one hand,
authority to control is also evidenced by an individual’s
ability to review and approve advertisements as well as
his or her ability to issue checks, make hiring decisions
and personally finance or pay for corporate expenses. See
Kitco of Nevada, Inc., 612 F. Supp. at 1293; FTC v. USA
Financial, 415 Fed. Appx. 970, 2011 WL 679430, at * 3
(11th Cir. 2011); FTC v. Stefanchik, No. C04-1852RSM,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25173, 2007 WL 1058579, at * 6-7
(W. D. Wash. Apr. 3, 2007). The FTC need not show that
the Defendant was the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”)
of a company to demonstrate authority to control, active
involvement in the affairs of the business and the deceptive
scheme is sufficient. See Kitco of Nevada, Inc., 612 F.
Supp. at 1293; FTC v. J.K. Publ’ns, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d
1176 (C.D. Cal. 2000).12
On the other hand, direct participation can be
demonstrated through evidence that the defendant
12. Defendant argued that the “control person” standard
enunciated in Dellastatious v. Williams, 242 F.3d 191 (4th Cir.
2001) should be applied. However, that case involved the “control”
standard enunciated in Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (“SEC Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a). As the FTC correctly
argued, the SEC Act’s control standard is not applicable in FTC
Act cases where FTC precedent is controlling and applies a
different “control” standard.
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developed or created, reviewed, altered and disseminated
the deceptive marketing materials. See FTC v. Direct
Mktg. Concepts, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 2d 285, 310-11 (D. Mass.
2008); Nat’l Urological Group, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 2d at
1207-08; Kitco of Nevada, Inc., 612 F. Supp. at 1293; J.K.
Publ’ns, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1203; FTC v. Am. Standard
Credit Sys., 874 F. Supp. 1080, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 1994). Active
supervision of employees as well as the review of sales and
marketing reports related to the deceptive scheme is also
demonstrative of direct participation. See Wilcox, 926 F.
Supp. at 1104; FTC v. Consumer Alliance, No. 02-C-2429,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17423, 2003 WL 22287364, at *6
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2003).
Although the FTC is only required to prove (a) that
Ms. Ross had authority to control or (b) that she directly
participated in the deceptive acts, the evidence in this
case demonstrates that Defendant Ross had both the
authority to control the deceptive acts within the meaning
of the Section 5 of the FTC Act and that she directly
participated in said acts. Although not explicitly labeled as
a controlling shareholder or partner of IMI, the evidence
reveals that Ms. Ross was an original founder of the
company and was known by all three of the other main
officers of the company as someone who would receive
and who received shares of the profits. As far as IMI
is concerned, none of the partnership agreements were
reduced to a writing but Mr. D’Souza sent letters in late
2006 terminating the Joint Venture between himself, as
a representative of Web Integrated Net Solutions, Inc.,
Mr. Jain, Mr. Sundin and notably Ms. Ross. Moreover, Ms.
Ross herself identified herself as the IMI Vice President of
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Business Development and stated that she was responsible
for business expansion, sales and marketing, as well as
product optimization. Nowhere did she state that she
was a media buyer. While she argued that her corporate
title was meaningless because IMI did not operate
under traditional corporate formalities, her role with the
company, her adoption of Defendants Jain and Sundin’s
affidavits in the Canadian Litigation and the plethora of
evidence in emails and chat logs indicate that she was a
control person at IMI.
Out of the six hundred employees, Ms. Ross has been
shown to be one of the founders, one of seven people to
approve expenses, one of the four to receive percentages
of the profits of IMI, and one of the main individuals
to appear in a managerial role in chat logs, emails and
advertising contracts. Furthermore, in her affidavit, Ms.
Drexler, now known as Ms. Novick, explicitly identified
Ms. Ross as one of the individuals responsible for the
deceptive marketing scheme at IMI. As such, the FTC
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that
Ms. Ross had authority to control the deceptive marketing
scheme at IMI.
Arguendo, even if Ms. Ross had not had authority to
control the deceptive acts at IMI, compelling evidence
establishes that she directly participated in the deceptive
marketing scheme. First, her interactions with the staff
and the developers indicate that she not only controlled
the contents and appearance of the ads, but that she also
reprimanded and disciplined departments when the work
did not coincide with her standards. Her co-defendants
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even acknowledged that they partnered with her because
of her marketing expertise. Secondly, the chat logs also
establish that she was involved in key company decisions
such as partnership arrangements (e.g., Sundin and a major
U.S. venture capital fi rm), how to reorganize the company
and whom to hire. Furthermore, she also had access to
company accounts and approved corporate expenses.
On several occasions she even opened advertising
accounts using her own personal credit card. While her
counsel argued at trial that she only personally spent
approximately $23,000 on accounts with MyGeek of the
$3.3 million spent, Ross did not submit any evidence that
other IMI employees funded those accounts. Moreover, the
Drexler affidavit specifically states that “[t]o place these
advertisements with MyGeek, she used credit cards in the
name of “M D” (which [Ms. Drexler] believe[d] to be Marc
D’Souza . . .), “Daniel Sundin,” and wire transfers from
IMI’s account.” Drexler Aff., Def.’s Ex. 1 at ¶ 106. The
FTC’s evidence demonstrates that Ms. Ross was not just
a staff member but that she supervised the ad developers,
made changes and gave orders concerning the ads, and
funded the dissemination of these ads, whether through
her own personal account or other accounts such as those
of IMI, Daniel Sundin and Marc D’Souza. As such, Ms.
Ross directly participated in the deceptive marketing
scheme.
Accordingly, Ms. Ross’s broad responsibilities at
IMI coupled with the fact that she personally financed
corporate expenses, oversaw a large amount of employees
and had a hand in the creation and dissemination of the
deceptive ads proves by a preponderance of the evidence
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that she had authority to control and directly participated
in the deceptive acts within the meaning of Section 5 of
the FTC Act.
2.

Knowledge

As mentioned previously, Defendant Ross contends
that even if she is found to have had authority to control
or directly participated in the deceptive acts, she did not
know of the deceptive marketing scheme. To establish
individual liability under section 5(a) the FTC must also
establish that an individual defendant had some knowledge
of the unlawful conduct. As previously mentioned, the
knowledge requirement may be “fulfi lled by showing
that the individual had ‘actual knowledge of material
misrepresentations, reckless indifference to the truth or
falsity of such misrepresentations, or an awareness of a high
probability of fraud along with an intentional avoidance of
the truth.’” Amy Travel, 875 F.2d at 574 (quoting FTC v.
Kitco of Nevada, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1282, 1292 (D. Minn.
1985)); see also FTC v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, Inc., 569
F. Supp. 2d 285, 311 (D. Mass. 2008) (noting that the FTC
must prove “that the individual defendants either knew or
should have known about the deceptive practices, but it is
not required to prove subjective intent to defraud.”). “[T]
he degree of participation in business affairs is probative
of knowledge.” Amy Travel, 875 F.2d at 574.
Courts have held that defendants have knowledge
of the deceptive marketing scheme where they “wrote
or reviewed many of the scripts that were found to be
deceptive and [where] they were undoubtedly aware of
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the avalanche of consumer complaints.” Id. at 575; see
also FTC v. Cyberspace.com, LLC, No. C00-1806L, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25565, 2002 WL 32060289, at * 5 (W.D.
Wash. 2002) (“There is ample evidence in the record
that defendant Eisenberg was directly involved in the
development of the deceptive marketing scheme . . . that
he reviewed at least some of the solicitation forms before
they were mailed, that he knew very few subscribers used
the internet services for which they were being billed, and
that he was aware that some of the consumers . . . did not
realize they had contracted for internet services.”). In
FTC v. Direct Marketing Inc., two defendants were held
to be “at least willfully blind or recklessly indifferent to
the deceptive” scheme because one was a co-owner of
the company, and attended managerial meetings where
he heard concerns about the product; and the other had
a controlling position at the corporation and “procured
placement” for the deceptive advertisements. 569 F. Supp.
2d 285, 311 (D. Mass. 2008). In FTC v. J.K. Publications,
Inc., involving credit card fraud scheme, the defendant’s
wife was held to be individually liable because her actions
demonstrated intentional avoidance of the truth and
reckless indifference. 99 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1207 (C.D. Cal.
2000). She was a corporate officer of the company, had
five years of experience as a bank teller and loan officer,
was aware of her husband’s criminal past, and personally
signed for purchases and opened bank accounts used to
perpetrate the deceptive acts. Id. at 1206-07. Moreover,
the court made note of the fact that she accepted the large
sums of money her husband brought into the household
despite knowing that his previous business ventures were
unsuccessful. Id. Conversely, the wife of the defendant in
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FTC v. QT, Inc., a case which involved the marketing of
a bracelet which falsely purported to cure arthritis, was
not determined to have had knowledge of the deceptive
scheme because she was only listed as a corporate
secretary and her responsibilities “did not include the
marketing of the Q-Ray bracelet or anything pertaining to
the marketing of the Q-Ray bracelet.” 448 F. Supp. 2d 908,
973 (N.D. Ill. 2006). Accordingly, when an individual (1)
had some level of participation in the development, review,
creation or editing of the deceptive marketing scheme,
(2) disseminated the deceptive advertisements, and (3)
was aware of complaints or problems surrounding the
marketed product or the advertisements, while he or she
may not necessarily have actual knowledge of the unlawful
acts, this individual is at best recklessly indifferent to the
truth or intentionally avoids it.
At trial, Ms. Ross’s counsel repeatedly argued that
Ms. Ross was duped by Defendants Jain, D’Souza and
Sundin. There is no evidence in this case to support this
argument, and once again counsel cannot testify for her
client. Another contention was that, unlike Mr. Jain and
Mr. Sundin, she used her real personal information when
opening accounts and that someone seeking to deceive
would have used false identifiers. She also argued that
some of the chat logs indicated that, if anything, she
actually believed IMI was a legitimate company that
provided “sound products” to its customers.
Nevertheless, the evidence presented in this case
demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that Ms.
Ross had actual knowledge of the deceptive marketing
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scheme. She wrote, edited, reviewed and participated
in the development of multiple advertisements. She
instructed developers to make the advertisements more
aggressive and on at least two occasions ordered them
to remove the term “advertisement” from certain ads.
She funded the accounts through which the ads were
disseminated to consumers. She was fully aware of the
many complaints from consumers and ad networks and
was in charge of remedying the problems. Moreover,
she had the marketing expertise and was trusted by her
partners because of that expertise.
Even if Ms. Ross, despite exercising significant control
over the advertisements, had not had actual knowledge
of their deceptive nature, the facts demonstrate that she
was at the very least recklessly indifferent or intentionally
avoided the truth. First, she was romantically involved
with Defendant Jain since before the creation of IMI.
Later on, in 2006, she became romantically involved with
Defendant D’Souza and submitted an affidavit against him
in the Canadian Litigation. Additionally, she had access to
Defendant Sundin’s email when she covered for him while
he was dealing with his illness.
Second, the evidence demonstrates that she received
shares of the business’s profits and made large sums
of money from it. Third, she received and was aware
of the numerous consumer and ad network complaints.
Notably, she knew that complaints concerned the fact that
the advertisements purported to scan but that the ads
themselves were not supposed to scan. She also knew that
the ads were “unpleasant” and that customer retention
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was low. She purported to fi x the problem, but the problem
continued to occur and she continued to receive complaints.
Additionally, MyGeek terminated the relationship with
IMI by informing her that her advertisements were
threatening MyGeek’s reputation. Moreover, she actively
participated in making the advertisements unpleasant and
instructed her developers to increase their aggression
level. Finally, she requested that the term “advertisement”
be removed from certain ads thereby further contributing
to the deception of customers. Consequently, the FTC has
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Ms.
Ross had actual knowledge of the deceptive marketing
scheme. Alternatively, her involvement with IMI and her
participation in the deceptive marketing scheme as well
as her awareness of consumer complaints demonstrate
that she acted with reckless indifference and intentionally
avoided the truth. As such, she is individually liable for
the deceptive acts of IMI, and judgment shall be entered
in favor of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”).
3.

Injunctive and Monetary Relief

Under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, “in proper
cases the Commission may seek, and after proper proof,
the court may issue a permanent injunction.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 53(b). This Court has previously held that “[t]he authority
to grant such relief includes the power to grant any
ancillary relief necessary to accomplish complete justice,
including ordering equitable relief for consumer redress
through the repayment of money, restitution, rescission,
or disgorgement of unjust enrichment.” FTC v. Ameridebt,
Inc., 373 F. Supp. 2d 558, 562 (D. Md. 2005) (citing FTC
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v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 1997)). “To insure
that any final relief is complete and meaningful, the court
may also order any necessary temporary or preliminary
relief, such as an asset freeze.” Ameridebt, 373 F. Supp.
2d at 562 (citing FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466,
469 (11th Cir. 1996)). The court therefore possesses broad
equitable authority which it must particularly exercise to
protect the public interest. Porter v. Warner Holding Co.,
328 U.S. 395, 398, 66 S. Ct. 1086, 90 L. Ed. 1332 (1946)
(citing Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329, 64 S. Ct.
587, 88 L. Ed. 754 (1944)). “Permanent injunctive relief
is appropriate when there is ‘some cognizable danger of
recurring violation.’” FTC v. Medical Billers Network,
Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 283, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). To make
this determination a court can consider the following
factors: “the defendants’ scienter, whether the conduct was
isolated or recurrent, whether defendants are positioned
to commit future violations, the degree of consumer harm
caused by defendants, defendants’ recognition of their
culpability, and the sincerity of defendants’ assurances
(if any) against future violations.” Id. (citing FTC v.
Minuteman Press, 53 F. Supp. 2d 248, 260-61 (E.D.N.Y.
1998)). “Moreover, the egregious nature of past violations
is a factor supporting the need for permanent injunctive
relief of a broad nature.” Kitco of Nevada, 612 F. Supp.
at 1296. Finally, the injunction must not “unduly harm
the defendants . . . [by] put[ing] them out of business, but
[must] simply ensure that they will conduct their business
in a manner which does not violate Section 5 of the FTC
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45.” Id.
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In this case, the FTC seeks to permanently restrain
and enjoin Ms. Ross from the marketing and sale of
computer security software and software that interferes
with consumers’ computer use as well as from engaging
in any form of deceptive marketing. Ms. Ross is found to
be responsible for the deceptive marketing scheme at IMI
which affected a large number of online consumers and
led to the fi ling of three thousand consumer complaints
with the FTC. The scheme generated large sums of
money, a portion of which went to Ms. Ross. Her expertise
in marketing was touted by her partners and used to
deceive and defraud a large number of consumers. As
such, a permanent injunction prohibiting Ms. Ross from
marketing computer security software and software that
interferes with consumers’ computer use is appropriate.
Finally, this permanent injunction does not in any way
harm her or deprive her of other employment opportunities.
She may still utilize her marketing talents as long as they
are used for legitimate products and ventures and do not
contribute to deceiving the public.
As far as consumer redress is concerned, “[t]he power
to grant ancillary relief includes the power to order
repayment of money for consumer redress as restitution
or recession.” Febre, 128 F.3d at 534; see also Ameridebt,
373 F. Supp. 2d at 563. As a permanent injunction can be
imposed on Ms. Ross she may also be liable for monetary
damages. Medical Billers Network, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d
at 324. In order to obtain restitution under Section 13(b),
however, the FTC must establish that “(1) the business
entity made material misrepresentations likely to deceive
consumers, (2) those misrepresentations were widely
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disseminated, and (3) consumers purchased the entity’s
products.” FTC v. Free Commc’n, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192,
1206 (10th Cir. 2005). “The proper measure of consumer
restitution is the amount that will restore the victims
to the status quo ante, not what defendants received as
profit.” FTC v. Cyberspace.com, LLC, et al., No. C001906L, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25565, 2002 WL 32060289,
at *5 (W.D. Wash. 2002). Specifically, “allowing a damages
determination based on gross receipts in a case arising
directly under the FTC Act furthers the FTC’s ability to
carry out its statutory purpose.” FTC v. Kuykendall, 371
F.3d 745, 765-66 (10th Cir. 2004); see also Febre, 128 F.3d
535-36. As such the amount of consumer redress is the
amount paid by consumers for the Defendants’ products
minus any refunds. Additionally, under section 13(b) a
court may order disgorgement of a defendant’s “unjust
enrichment” when it is not possible to reimburse all of
the consumers who have been injured by the defendant’s
misrepresentations. FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d
466, 470 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing FTC v. Pantron I Corp.,
33 F.3d 1088, 1103 n. 34 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1083,
115 S. Ct. 1794, 131 L. Ed. 2d 722 (1995). Once the FTC
has satisfied its burden, it is up to the defendant to show
that the calculations are not accurate. FTC v. QT, Inc.,
448 F. Supp. 2d 908, 974 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
In this case, the FTC has satisfied its burden to show
that the Defendants made material misrepresentations
which were likely to deceive, that those misrepresentations
affected a large number of consumers and that more than
one million consumers bought Defendants’ products. The
FTC correctly notes that if Defendant Ross is found to be
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individually liable for the deceptive scheme, she is jointly
and severally liable for the consumer redress amount of
$163,167,539.95 calculated by the FTC.13 Defendant Ross
argued, however, that this sum was grossly overinflated
and that she should only be held liable for the ads and
products she herself marketed at MyGeek. Specifically,
counsel for Defendant Ross noted that “the FTC cannot
disgorge from an individual defendant net revenue
received by the Enterprise before or after the defendant
directly participated in, or had authority to control, the
deception.” FTC v. Wash. Data Res., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1247,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56233, at *86 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 23,
2012). In response, the FTC has correctly noted that Ms.
Ross had the opportunity to present financial information
and to respond to discovery but has failed to do so.
It is well established that once a defendant is found
to be individually liable for a corporate defendant’s
deceptive acts, he or she is jointly and severally liable for
the total amount of consumer redress. See, e.g., FTC v.
J.K. Publ’ns, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2000); FTC
v. Kitco of Nevada, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Minn.
1985). Ms. Ross participated and had authority to control
the advertising scheme from its inception until it was
13. According to the FTC, this amount was calculated based
on Defendants’ profit and loss statements for 2004-2006, and
Defendants’ payment processor records for 2006-2007. Proposed
Final Pre-Trial Order at 22, ECF No. 239. Moreover, the FTC
has repeatedly stated that this amount represents a ceiling for
monetary recovery and this Court has previously held that this
amount was a reasonable approximation of the damages in this
case.
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interrupted by the FTC. Moreover, Ms. Ross was at least
recklessly indifferent to or intentionally avoided the truth
when it came to the deceptive marketing scheme, and the
FTC satisfied its burden with respect to the imposition of
consumer redress. Defendant Ross had sufficient time to
challenge the amount of recovery proposed by the FTC
by proposing her own calculation and amount but failed
to do so. Having previously determined that the amount
calculated by the FTC was a reasonable approximation of
consumer redress, this Court finds that Defendant Ross
is jointly and severally liable for $163,167,539.95 in this
case. Accordingly, Defendant Ross shall be permanently
restrained and enjoined from the marketing and sale of
computer security software and software that interferes
with consumers’ computer use as well as from engaging
in any form of deceptive marketing. Defendant Ross shall
also be jointly and severally liable with co-Defendants
Innovative Marketing, Inc., Sam Jain and Daniel Sundin
for the consumer redress amount of $163,167,539.95.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Judgment is hereby
entered in favor of Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission
against Defendant Kristy Ross, individually and as
an officer of Innovative Marketing, Inc. on all Counts
contained in the FTC Complaint. Defendant Ross shall be
permanently restrained and enjoined from the marketing
and sale of computer security software and software
that interferes with consumers’ computer use as well
as from engaging in any form of deceptive marketing.
Defendant Ross shall also be jointly and severally liable
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with co-Defendants Innovative Marketing, Inc., Sam Jain
and Daniel Sundin for the consumer redress amount of
$163,167,539.95.
A separate Order and Judgment follows.
Dated: September 24, 2012
/s/
Richard D. Bennett
United States District Judge
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ORDER & JUDGMENT
For the reasons stated in the foregoing Memorandum
Opinion, this 24th day of September 2012, it is HEREBY
ORDERED and ADJUDGED:
1. That Judgment is entered in favor of
Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)
against Defendant Kristy Ross, individually
and as an officer of Innovative Marketing, Inc.
on all Counts contained in the FTC Complaint;
2. That Defendant Kristy Ross shall be
permanently restrained and enjoined from
the marketing and sale of computer security
software and software that interferes with
consumers’ computer use as well as from
engaging in any form of deceptive marketing;
3. That Defendant Ross shall be jointly
and severally liable with the co-Defendants
Innovative Marketing, Inc., Sam Jain and
Daniel Sundin for the consumer redress amount
of $163,167,539.95;
4. That any and all prior rulings made by
the Court disposing of any claims against any
parties are incorporated by reference therein,
and this Order shall be deemed to be a final
Judgment within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ.
P. 58;
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5. That the Clerk of the Court transmit copies
of this Order and accompanying Memorandum
Opinion to counsel for the parties; and
6. That the Clerk of the Court CLOSE
THIS CASE.
/s/
Richard D. Bennett
United States District Judge
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APPENDIX C —Appendix
STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS
Year

2013
2012
20111
2010
2009
2008

Consumer
Protection
Federal
Actions Filed
43
62
43
38
83
64

Reported Total Amount of
Redress and Disgorgement
Ordered in Judgments
(in millions of dollars)
$297
741.5
223.7
368
393
371.2

Totals

333

$2,393.7

Source: http://www.ftc.gov/policy/reports/policy-reports/
ftc-annual-reports

1. 2008 to 2011 reports include the data range of March of the
named year to February of the next year. Starting with 2012, the
FTC reports calendar year statistics. The 2012 row likely includes
results that were already included in the 2011 row: any data within
the date range January 1 to February 29, 2012.

